People: The Call To Be Heard

Read: Problems in Brazilian Geopolitics

Brazil, Introduction

What is Brazil? What is its identity? Is there such thing as a Brazilian people or a Brazilian nation? Is there a single Brazil or rather several “Brazils”? These are questions faced not only by foreigners curious about this huge South American country but also by any nonconformist Brazilian in the 21st century. Delving into these questions shall shed some light on global issues. For Brazilians, these are the propedeutic questions that must be addressed before embarking upon any political-civilizational project involving Brazil and Latin America. Because few topics are more central to this critical age of ours – the age of ultramodernity – than the topic of identity.

We could, of course, follow in our journey the suggestions of the late Brazilian anthropologist and intellectual Darcy Ribeiro who, in his masterpiece Brazilian Peoples (1999), proposed at least five Brazils: a crioulo Brazil (African-Brazilian), an Amazon caboclo one (of Native Indian ancestry), a cowboy sertanejo one (of the Brazilian bush or steppes), a caipira one (peasant Brazilian), and also the Southern Brazil (with its gauchos and gringos). Expanding his classification, we could also talk of the following Brazils: coast-side, rural, Native, Quilombola , Baroque, and also a cosmopolitan and a metropolitan Brazil, where Liberalism has diffused much more widely and where the capitalist mode of production – which is gradually reaching its financist stage (Dugin, 2010) ‒ has become firmly consolidated. As a matter of fact, Brazilian identitarian makeup (from either an ethnic-racial or an ethnic-geographical point of view) can hardly be understood in homogeneous terms or in a homogenizing mindset – to paraphrase Carl Schmitt, Brazil is no political universe but instead a pluriverse.

A hundred and ninety three years of political independence seem not to have been enough to provide satisfactory answers to the above problems and here lies the great difficulty in building a civilizational project for Luso-America. Brazil, in the last two centuries, has been ruled by factions, parties and leaders representing to a greater or lesser extent all the great three political theories of modernity, which are, according to Russian Philosopher Alexandr Dugin, liberalism (First Political Theory, born in the 18th century), socialism (Second Political Theory, appearing in the 19th century) and nationalism (Third Political Theory, emerged in the 20th century). These theories wanted to resolve the paradigms set by the Modern Era, such as individuality, progressism, the scientific method and approach, reason, the defeat of the Traditional world. All three theories spent the 20th century fighting each other for hegemony, and the absolute winner was liberalism, with the overthrow of the Third Political Theory in 1945 and the Second Political Theory in 1991. The outcomes of being governed by leaders issued from these three political theories, good or bad, have proved to be insufficient from the point of view of the identitarian multiplicity that constitutes the very core of the Brazilian nation since its beginnings.

Moreover, everything that has been built by the country's previous leaders as part of a civilizational project was actually done so on a sort of travesty or parody – on houses of cards atop buried lost truths. The Brazilian ruling classes of all three political theories have tried to vertically impose some sort of "ideal" image of what Brazil should be. They tried to create a modern identity for its peoples out of fantasies, mystifications and surfaces. However, in a territory such as ours, populated by so many different communities (by diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religions mixed together in varying degrees and organically established generations ago), any attempt to carry out a project based on an abstract simulacrum of identity will inevitably annihilate internal diversity, favoring an official paradigm of "national unification" in a state project designed by uprooted intellectuals – who end up being the tools of a predatory nomadism, characteristic of the globalist elites with a cosmoliberal mindset.

The Three Modern Political Theories in a Brazilian Scenario

All three political theories of modernity can, to some degree, be blamed for the corrosion of Brazil's traditional communities: The government of Getulio Vargas, for instance, which is the main exponent of the Third Political Theory (nationalist ideology) in Brazil. During his Nationalization Campaign, Vargas went so far as to publicly burn the State flags (under the National Union Flag), thereby suppressing regional identities for the sake of a so-called national unification. He went on to repress Brazil's German communities, placing limits on public usage of the German language (ROST, 2008; WERLE, 2003) and so on. President Vargas promoted a rather vague and ambiguous notion of "true brazility" as something that could be found, or so went the rhetoric, in the “real Brazilians”, the Amerindians – not the German, Italian or other more recent European (non-Portuguese) migrants. The fate of both Indians and European migrants, however, was to be the same – in Vargas’s nationalist project the Natives were to be actually integrated in the "Brazilian nationality," leaving behind their aboriginal condition (GARFIELD; COLLEGE, 2000, p. 18). Also, despite having created economical development and taken a non-aligned position in relation to the plutocratic powers of the world, the Vargas regime made Integralism and other third position movements illegal.

Vargas’s death opened up room for treasonous rulers aligned with Atlanticism, in a succession of failures and instability which culminated in the fall of João Goulart’s (Jango) short National Labourist administration, and in the 1964 coup d'état, giving way to the deep liberalism that haunts the country up to the present day. The repressive violence employed by the military was justified by the supposedly overriding threat of communism.

Initially supported by the CIA, the Brazilian military government was based on an anticommunism and patriotism of the bourgeois-chauvinist type. As for foreign policy, in the final phase of the regime, there was in fact (for pragmatic reasons) a certain diversification of international relations; alliances with the non-aligned nations were sought, especially during General Ernesto Geisel’s administration in the 1970s. However, in the domestic sphere, the Brazilian military regime did not offer a very promising fate to organic communities: by way of repression and genocide, indigenous peoples of various ethnic groups were massacred: the Pataxó of Bahia State were purposely infected with smallpox; the Krenak of Maranhão state had their ancient and traditional ways of life targeted (labeled as mental pathologies) and were sent en masse to mental asylums for the most trivial reasons and so on.

In the sphere of the Second Political Theory (leftist ideology), the identitarian question might be placed in different terms. The main reason why it is so difficult to determine what the Brazilian identity is lies in the fact that throughout history Brazil's geopolitical alliances were made with groups and nations that had little in common with our own historical fate, such as the Anglo-Saxon nations (one might add that those alliances were always to our disadvantage), while, to the same extent the Latin-American and Hispanic-Iberian ties were neglected. The identity of any given nation is closely related to its continental identity and, clearly, Brazil was formed out of a dual synthesis between the Iberian nations (Spain and Portugal) and the Latin-American indigenous nations. Our natural ties with the latter are of a much stronger nature than with the former.

It is in the light of this context that “Bolivarian” projects (and initiatives such as the Fórum de São Paulo) must be understood. Among the several possibilities of an integration of Brazil itself (or rather of the different Brazils) in a supranational bloc, the Bolivarian proposal is a notorious alternative, represented by Hugo Chávez's project of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, that is, the ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América). ALBA's project could potentially integrate Brazil into a great space built upon anti-Americanism, Latin-American autochthonous socialism and the local cultures of indigenous and catholic persuasion.

One could also potentially think of a continental integration including all Latin American countries (not just South America), such as the one idealized by Norberto Ceresole and by Alberta Buela (1999) or even other such projects like André Martin's Meridionalism. Perhaps also a Hispanic-imperial solution, based on the reconstruction of Filipe II’s Empire and the goal of opposing, if not neutralizing English influence worldwide – or at least in this part of the world (Empire against imperialism, as Italian Philosopher Julius Evola would say).

In short, independent of the specific content of each integrationist proposal, both the continental union and the strengthening of economic and political ties with the alternative nations (especially with anti-systemic and anti-imperialistic countries) could mean for Brazil not only economic, but identitarian survival. It is true, though, that not all leftists can see things outside their economist lenses. They suffer from a nearsightedness that has substantially contributed to the fragmentation of the Left and the creation of endless internal struggles, all to the advantage of cosmoliberal advocacy.

Nevertheless, the recapturing and building of identitarian ties within both of these great spaces would require a definitive break with today's geopolitical model. First and foremost, it would call for political and ideological agents capable of taking these potential projects ahead in spite of foreign interferences. Nowadays, Brazil’s closest agent to performing this task is the Workers’ Party (PT), of social-democrat affiliation. The Workers’ Party is Brazil’s only coherent political power in the sphere of the Second Political Theory, but it has lately adopted a conciliatory policy, shaping its course of action by means of a compromise with the great financial oligarchies.

The BRICS group, which could very possibly provide us with an alternative to the alliance with the Anglo-Saxon bloc, is yet to be properly explored by Brazil. It remains a secondary choice, while relations with the USA are still favored. Maintaining such a dichotomist foreign policy has its costs: firstly, the sacrifice of Brazil’s own economic and productive emancipation; secondly, the gradual loss of its cultural identity, replaced by an artificial, alien and imposed mass culture that manifests itself in ethnic violence.

In the last four years of President Dilma Rousseff's government, for instance, murders in the countryside have grown exponentially – indigenous leaders, peasants and even local religious leaders have been killed in rural areas by landowners and hired gunmen (CANUTO; LUZ; COSTA, 2014). Suicide rates among indigenous communities are currently above the national average. This indicates that the indigenous communities of Brazil are feeling the full effects of anomie, mass industrialization, and the ongoing alienation from their land. This is a crisis of an identitarian nature, occurring under the wings of the developmentalist technocratic policies undertaken by the current Second Political Theory government. In practice, such policies consist in evicting regional communities from their homelands in order to build industries and hydroelectric power plants.

As for the First Political Theory, it had its zenith in the 1990s during President Collor’s short term in office (he was impeached in 1992) followed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (FHC) neoliberal administration. FHC was a plutocratic president who privatized a considerable part of the national economic sectors and who kept a close relationship with the deliberative organs of globalism – the Bilderberg Club, the CIA and those foundations tied to philanthropic capital, such as the Ford Foundation. The story of this relationship was told by British historian F. Stonor Saunders in Who Paid the Piper? During this period, Brazilian foreign policy was tied to a strictly economist outlook. Its defenders argued that Brazil should acknowledge the economic hegemony of the advanced capitalist nations, such as the USA, Japan and the countries of Western Europe. Thus, a solid relationship with these countries should be built because their markets would play a key role in absorbing Brazilian exports and their capital would be essential for investments in the national economy.

However, the entire process of privatization, the structural reforms and the implementation of international agendas had severe consequences, such as the signing of the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Treaty in 1998 and also the acceptance of the USA’s project of creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The following were some of the consequences: low international financial return, an intensive process of denationalizing the economy, a boost in the cost of living, unemployment and increased social inequalities. It was this state of affairs that opened Brazil to the emergence of political and ideological forces of a national-developmentalist brand which emphatically advocated policies of social justice and inclusion. This was the context in which the Workers’ Party – i.e. the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) – attained its first presidential electoral victory (president Lula in 2002, re-elected and followed by Dilma Rousseff of the same party, also re-elected and president as of 2015).

The Dubious Way In Our History

Our goal here is none other than to correct the old Luso-Brazilian mistake of giving preference to the domination of an alien Anglo-Saxon Atlanticist agenda which, at the same time, denies our Iberian roots. This pattern seems to be a historical constant that can be seen in past events such as the Revolution of Avis and its climax in the Battle of Aljubarrota (1385), when the interests of the merchant bourgeoisie (supported by the Pope) prevailed over the Portuguese pro-Spanish faction, connected to the old nobility. One should notice that Spain (allied to France) was, at that time, a kingdom of a more feudal character and the victory of the nobility in Portugal would have been a hard blow to its merchant class. France and Spain, in geopolitical terms, represented Land Power, as opposed to Sea Power (England, in this case having co-opted Portugal).

These episodes are part of that historical process that made Portugal one of the first modern nation-states in Europe – a state that founded a maritime empire. It is this Portugal that is sung, in all its contradictions, by poets such as Gil Vicente and Luis de Camões; a double Portugal: a nation of traditions – Christian, peasant, heroic, conqueror – and, at the same time, a merchant and thalassocratic nation of modernity. A deep nation and a bourgeois nation: One which gave birth to the Island of the True Cross; the other, to brazilwood (pau-brasil).

Apparently, the false “English” Portugal prevailed here. It was in the image of this Portugal that the insurgent Brazilian nation, which became an Empire in 1822, mirrored itself when it walked the path of debt with the House of Rothschild to finance the crushing of the regional revolts during the Regency Era; when, together with Albion, it fought a war with its brother nation of Paraguay; and when it massacred the Catholic peasant community of Canudos, baptizing the nascent Republic in blood.

This is all the result of centuries of fratricidal warfare fought in the context of the historical process of building our modernity to forge an Enlightened national identity. The cost of such a colossal endeavor can be best expressed by the Portuguese word atraso (a sense of backwardness and delay): a nation that could become the counter-hegemonic Heartland, the pole of a Catholic Latin insurgency that would have shook the very foundations of the modern world. But that was not so.
There is an unfulfilled project in modern Brazil, para inglês ver, in the popular saying (meaning that “it is just-for-show”, “for the Englishmen to see it”). Underneath this pretense of modernity, in the deep strata lie many real Brazils, enclaves and islands. The former is juridically and discursively constructed by social thought and the ruling classes over the latter, that is, over the ancient forces of the deep Brazils – a pluriverse of northeastern sertões (steppes), pampas, Amazon ribeirinhos and cerrado; all surrounded by rural towns, coastline cities, metropoles and megalopoles. This configuration makes up a hierarchized network that is the contemporary face of archeomodern Brazil, in Dugin’s parlance. What paths come to light?

The Multipolar Endeavor and BRICS

A possible path to follow based on multipolarity will necessarily consider alternatives such as the aforementioned BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). BRICS concerns not only Brazilians, Russians, et al., but all of the earth’s peoples. Here a geopolitical mindset is needed.

If, as we have discussed, Brazilian identitarian features require, for their very survival, action, practicality and a political project, it is nonetheless true that these things call for a reference to guide them. There is, indeed, an interdependence between identitarian survival and a political project. The latter is in need of something on which to base itself – the “national interest,” a classical term of geopolitical literature which may seem vague enough or just insufficient for our purposes. But, the raison d'être of Geopolitics resides basically in producing an accurate reading of the national interest, or, in other words, grasping the very essence of the population it is dealing with, so that this essence may point the way for domestic and foreign policy to pursue.

In the sphere of domestic policy, the construction of a multipolar world poses itself as the great parameter to be sought. Multipolarity, in geopolitical terms, may provide greater stability to the international system, as the new balance of power would make military aggression a very costly act for the aggressors (due to the possibility of equally intense counter-attacks). However, the stability of the international system is not, in itself, the sole reason to aim for such a parameter. It is quite possible to argue that a bipolar world could be equally stable, as it also contains a balance of power. The advantage that a multipolar world would provide is that such a balance of power could take place while at the same time a certain number of power poles could maintain their own sovereignty and autonomy – that is, they could remain faithful to the real essence of their populations (DUGIN, 2012).

In this way, multipolarity would mean something quite different for Brazilian independence and autonomy from that which was experienced during the Cold War – a time when one could even acknowledge a certain stability in the international system. Nevertheless, real autonomy and independence was restricted by the USA, the power that de facto defined the parameters of action for the Western World. Besides that, a multipolar world would provide a greater availability of options to forge alliances, agreements, treaties and international arrangements, allowing Brazil to accommodate those which better reflect its national interest. Multipolarity would, in the last resort, provide us collective liberty.

The seed of a projection towards multipolarity in matters of foreign policy was in fact planted during PT Lula’s administration (2003-2010). The principles that guided PT’s policy had parallels in the early 1960s, in the administrations of presidents Jânio Quadros and the Leftist João Goulart (“Jango”). It is interesting to note that such principles were later recovered by the very military regime that overthrew Jango, in its next phase, under president Geisel, 1974-1979 (GONÇALVES, 2010).
In the Brazilian quest for a multipolar world the BRICS group exerts a fundamental role. BRICS appeared under a quite informal character. Economist Jim O’Neill first mentioned it in a study as the next group of countries to have economic ascension and to whom it would be interesting to form a group in order to coordinate their common interests. The initiative to create the informal BRIC group (from which the BRICS group materialized) came mainly from Russia and Brazil, as told by then-chancellor (of Brazil) Celso Amorim.

One thing that should be highlighted is the status of the BRICS group projects in the international sphere. Its members see themselves and project themselves as emerging powers. Not as future imperialist powers but as representatives of a large part of the geopolitical South’s claims and vindications. In this spirit, one of the goals of BRICS is to create alternatives to the current model of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (COOPER AND FARROQ, 2015). The international status that BRICS provides grants the creation of counters and balances to the current order, avowing an alternative model to exist – one which the developing world may support as part of a project for a new international order.

Finally, it is important to stress the great significance of the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). After a few internal conflicts (e.g. China and India both aiming for hosting the bank headquarters), NDB is finally in the process of forming and shall have an initial capital of fifty billion dollars. It intends to finance heavy engineering projects in the developing world. The bank has an equitable power structure and one of its goals is to be an alternative to reduce dependency on traditional sources of funding. It seeks to cater to non-members also. Besides that, BRICS has set up a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (amounting to 100 billion dollars) which will create even greater stability and may turn out to be a quite useful tool in dealing with the liquidity crises which often arise courtesy of the USA and EU.

The Brazilian role in this process is rather peculiar. Brazil is in a strategic position to deal with BRICS-Latin American relations or, in other words, to provide support and to help shape the way in which Latin America shall fit into a new world that craves multipolarity, autonomy and respect for peoples’ identities.

The Jumbled Path

In the sphere of domestic policy, the Brazilian political scenario in Dilma Rousseff’s second term of office is quite unstable, and in a way unseen since the 1990s. Rousseff’s troubles started before the last election. She won by a tight margin, defeating the somewhat neoliberal PSDB (Social Democrat Party) candidate Aécio Neves. The president got reelected and faced a very delicate and complex situation: a rebellious presidential allied base, a hostile Congress, the effects of the international economic crisis finally being felt in Brazil, successive corruption scandals involving her PT party (Workers’ Party), all eagerly reported by the establishment media and, on top of that, a shrinking economy. Such are the challenges faced by the reelected administration.

In a clear attempt to please the market (that mysterious yet infallible force), Dilma Rousseff is starting her second term already in flagrant contradiction with her original campaign promises via a series of liberal moves:
1. Pleasing the national and international oligarchic class: the president has, for instance, appointed Kátia Abreu as Minister of Agriculture, Ms. Abreu of PMDB (center-right party) being a notorious mouthpiece for Monsanto and a typical member of the rural land owning oligarchic class;
2. Guaranteeing a compromise with the banking establishment and international speculative capital interests: the new Minister of Finances is none other than “Chicago Boy” Joaquim Levy, the former president of Bradesco Asset Management, a division of Brazil's second largest private bank. Mr. Levy also held several positions in the IMF (in the 1990s) and was one of the architects of the austerity programs that doomed nations such as Spain, Ireland and Greece in the following decade;
3. Cuts on essential sectors: Rousseff/Levy’s unpopular measures include spending cuts on education and other key programs.

Meanwhile, Brazilian banks show record profits and Brazil’s public debt has some of the highest interest rates in the world.

This scenario provides us with a clear example of how Brazil is approaching the post-liberal phase of its history, thereby confirming Alexander Dugin’s prognostics in his book The Fourth Political Theory and corroborating the historical-ideological phenomena and processes described therein.

Nonetheless, not even all of that seems to be enough to please the financial community. Rousseff’s PT still does not sit well with them. The growth in polarization since last election means they are closer than ever to having their ideal scenario. Moreover, Brazil’s public demonstrations in 2013 have proved that there is fertile soil for a bolder move. As a result, we are witnessing the rise of a coup network among the right-wing libertarian types (with populist-conservative overtones).

The dissatisfaction with Rousseff’s government is present in many sectors: from those who voted for defeated PSDB candidate Aécio Neves to the leftists (which also encompasses the unions), to all the many disappointed workers who resent fiscal squeeze policies, not to mention the academic researchers who can no longer benefit from their scholarship and funding programs. Few people still have the disposition to defend the government.

Looking forward to instrumentalizing this general frustration, newly risen Libertarian movements (funded by American organizations such as the Atlas Network and the Koch Brothers web) have been ostentatiously spreading anti-PT propaganda through the various social networks. They aim to bring people out to the streets, organizing protests to demand the removal of President Rousseff from power (be it impeachment or resignation). We even hear, with more and more frequency, popular claims for yet another military coup. These are usually depoliticized manifestations “against corruption,” and middle class reactions against a constructed conspiratorial propaganda according to which all Latin American nations which have been engaged in counter-hegemonic efforts are, actually, a part of some global communist movement tied to the international Left and committed to the promotion of anti-family and anti-religious agendas. Ironically, the main international promoter of such movements and of color revolutions as mechanisms of economic, social and cultural homogenization is, precisely, the USA, which imposes western values as ideal standards.

The truth is that popular discontent with PT leadership is anything but natural. It is also true that president Lula’s government introduced many advances, such as a foreign policy which has placed Brazil in a more sovereign position, and also significant improvements for Brazil’s poorest citizens through the implementation of social programs. Rousseff, his successor, did not accomplish any such feats, and was forced to step back in many ways. And so, Brazil has remained a commodity exporter, without any great efforts to strengthen its industry or any educational/cultural projects which could provide the nation with real meaning. Rousseff’s administration has also shown great disregard for national defense; and her spirit of servitude toward the market has only heightened the people’s rage. The educational program proposed by Rousseff consists, basically, in the promotion of the American Way of Life as a paradigm for nation building. In the end, Lula and Rousseff’s greatest achievement is their contribution for the construction of the BRICS bank – an accomplishment that will last for posterity.

The Fourth Political Theory as a Civilizing Project

Thus, the main challenge we Brazilians face is to determine what tools are left to consent to a more authentic and organic interpretation of Brazil and therefore lay the groundwork for a civilizational project that does not suffer from the same vicissitudes of all previous national projects. We believe that few countries need the Fourth Political Theory’s gnoseological tools more than Brazil. The search for the present and organic concreteness of each people as a political subject is that which shall permit the establishment of Brazil as a house of many peoples – several nations interconnected, organically tied and yet autonomous. Unity in multiplicity (in varietate concordia) – plurality for a common destiny. Voluntary separation in a common space. In the same spirit, Julius Evola writes about the need for an inner Jihad and an outer Jihad; Brazil needs an inner struggle against a form of homegrown cultural imperialism which attempts to level all cultures that dwell on its territory. Brazil, in short, needs an inner multipolarity (just as it needs outer multipolarity. As above, so below). This internal struggle for peoples’ identities is the very condition of possibility that shall let Brazil place itself before the other peoples of the world as a stronghold and an example of the multiple possibilities of this new political theory – as a theory of peoples and their civilizations.