Terrorist Blitz In Syria

Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS), which is designated as a terrorist group by several countries including Turkiye, blitzed through northern Syria over the past few days. They captured Aleppo and are now at the gates of Hama at the time of this analysis’ publication. A significant portion of their fighters are from Uzbekistan and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. They couldn’t have achieved what they did without Turkiye’s backing, which has reverted to its policy of informally aiding regional extremist groups.

This observation is worth reflecting on since Turkiye had largely abandoned that approach over the past few years, mostly only providing just enough support for them to maintain their hold in Idlib region, and had even recently sought to patch up its problems with Syria. It now appears that it was practicing a dual policy whereby it maintained pragmatic trade relations with Russia despite Western pressure and extended an olive branch to Syria only to also be secretly preparing for this blitz behind their back.

The timing comes right after the Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire entered into effect. The outcome of the latest war between them is widely considered to have greatly damaged Hezbollah, which is one of the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) top allies and previously helped them liberate a lot of the country. At the same time, Israeli airstrikes over the years and especially the last one also seemed to have inflicted a similar degree of damage upon the IRGC, another one of the SAA’s allies that was instrumental to its past successes.

Turkiye must have noticed how the regional balance of power shifted and thus decided to take advantage of this at what Erdogan deemed to be the most opportune moment. Ankara’s goals remain unclear, but they can be surmised as wanting to coerce Damascus into at least granting broad Bosnian-like autonomy to its Islamist proxies in Syria, including terrorist-designated ones like HTS. Assad has always insisted on retaining his unitary state, however, hence another of his problems with Erdogan.

It turns out that the SAA didn’t have as solid of a hold over northern Syria as was thought seeing as how far they retreated over the past few days and the fact that they gave up the country’s second-largest city almost without a fight. The false perception of their strength was in hindsight due to the compelling narratives pushed by sympathetic members of the Alt-Media Community, who were considered credible by other members due to their factual reporting on the conflict, especially exposing Western plots.

They created the impression that the SAA was a force to be reckoned with, ignoring what can now be concluded in retrospect was the pivotal role played by Russia, Hezbollah, and the IRGC in all of its past successes. In fact, those three arguably did the heavy lifting while the SAA took the credit. After Russia became distracted by the special operation and Hezbollah and the IRGC were weakened by Israel, the SAA proved that it was unable to hold onto those gains on its own under heavy Turkish-backed pressure.

What’s all the more surprising about what just happened is how unprepared the SAA was. It didn’t detect the troop buildup in advance, nor did it set up any serious defenses to stop their offensive. There was nearly half a decade of peace between the last Russian-brokered ceasefire in March 2020 and now, so it reflects very poorly on the SAA that it was caught off guard and didn’t prepare for this. It looks like they took the relative peace for granted and might have even been weakened from within by corruption.

The present state of affairs is very perilous. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and the UAE have all pledged their support for Syria since the terrorist blitzkrieg, but the first two have limited capabilities to help as was explained while there are no credible reports that the last two are considering any direct assistance. The impending Battle of Hama, in which Turkiye might provide more direct assistance to HTS if the SAA pushes back its proxy, will most immediately determine the next military-strategic dynamics of this war.

The Line of Contact (LOC) might freeze if both sides hold their own, it could expand towards Homs – and perhaps rapidly so – if the SAA loses yet again, or the SAA could regain some of its lost ground. Additional factors to consider are the role of the Syrian Kurds (which Turkiye considers to be terrorists), the US, and Israel. Regarding the first, no major battles have yet to be fought between them and Turkiye’s allies, so either both sides are playing it cool, a deal was struck, or they’re preparing to fight.

Turkiye justified its previous conventional military interventions in Syria on the pretext of stopping this group’s territorial expansion and degrading its capabilities so it’s possible that Ankara could exploit any forthcoming hostilities between them and its proxies to conventionally intervene there yet again. The Syrian Kurds, just like Turkiye’s Islamist proxies are assumed to be (including its terrorist-designated ones like HTS), also want broad Bosnian-like autonomy but have repeatedly been rebuffed by Assad.

He considers them to be American proxies for dividing-and-ruling Syria due to them hosting US troops and occupying the most agriculturally and energy-rich areas of the country. Interestingly, the SAA reportedly let some of their forces enter Aleppo during their retreat to secure the city, yet the Syrian Kurds gave up the airport to HTS without a fight. One scenario is therefore that either Assad or Turkiye’s umbrella groups promise them the autonomy that they want in exchange for taking their side.

From Ankara’s perspective, an autonomous Kurdish polity is threatening only insofar as it’s ruled by the present group in power, the YPG, which it considers to be the same as the PKK. It’s not opposed to autonomy per se seeing as how it accepts the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, but that’s only because it’s ruled by Turkish-friendly Kurds who aren’t allied with the PKK. If the YPG is replaced or openly breaks with the PKK, then Turkiye might accept an autonomous Kurdish polity in Syria.

Assad might also become desperate enough to win back the north that he’ll reconsider his prior principled refusal of their autonomous project, but even then, a lot would depend on what the US does since it’s the YPG’s top ally, something that’s caused serious problems between it and Turkiye in the past. RFK Jr. revealed shortly after the last US elections that Trump wants to withdraw American troops from Syria, but the new situation there might lead to him changing his mind or being dissuaded by others.

He doesn’t like Islamists and his nominee for Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has previously expressed strong disapproval of Turkiye’s regional policies so he might also consider bombing HTS just like he bombed ISIS if Assad grants the Kurds autonomy and lets US companies operate there. Another scenario is that Israel redirects its Syrian bombing campaign away from the IRGC and Hezbollah towards HTS but only if Assad kicks the first two out and/or formally cedes the occupied Golan Heights.

Israel used to help Islamist groups in Syria before, but it’s also in a war of words with Turkiye over Gaza that could evolve into a proxy war if Tel Aviv gets what it wants from Damascus for taking its side against HTS. To be absolutely clear, Assad hasn’t signaled anything that could remotely be interpreted as an interest in cutting a deal with the US or Israel, but these scenarios still can’t be ruled out due to how desperate he might soon become if the SAA loses the impending Battle of Hama.

It's premature to predict how the post-conflict situation in Syria could look, but if a political deal is reached with Turkiye for granting broad Bosnian-like autonomy to its Islamist proxies, then it’s possible that Arab League peacekeepers led by the UAE and perhaps also Egypt could be deployed along the LOC. The same goes for the LOC between government forces and the Kurds, though this speculative peacekeeper contingent might include Russian forces, which are on cordial terms with that group.

Any political settlement could also be accompanied by phased sanctions relief from the US for facilitating Syria’s reconstruction that could also be led by the uber-wealthy UAE, which was importantly the first Arab country to enter into a rapprochement with Damascus. The US probably wouldn’t lift any of its sanctions so long as the IRGC and Hezbollah remain there though, and since there’s no indication that Assad is planning to kick them out, this might ultimately not come to pass.

From the Russian perspective, the best-case scenario is of course for the SAA to achieve a maximum victory against all terrorist forces and liberate all of its occupied land, including from the US-backed Kurds. That’s unlikely to happen due to the SAA’s systemic weaknesses that were just exposed as was explained and the possibility of a direct Turkish intervention in HTS’ support for freezing the LOC if its proxy is being pushed back too far and too fast by the SAA.

Likewise, even on the off chance that Russia drops some of its new Oreshnik missiles against terrorist targets there that Putin recently boasted have the destructible power of a nuclear bomb if several are used at once but without the radioactive fallout, Turkiye could still intervene to freeze the conflict. Therefore, the most realistic that Russia can likely aim for is the SAA destroying Russian and former Soviet terrorists in Syria or at least containing them there along with preserving its military bases.

After all, it was the influx of Russian nationals and former Soviet citizens to Syria to join ISIS that prompted Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention there in 2015 out of fear that these terrorists would return home and wreak havoc, so it therefore follows that this remains Russia’s primary military imperative. Its airbase in Khmeimim and naval one in Tartus also play important logistical roles for Russia’s PMC activities in Africa so losing them would cripple its newfound security-centric policy there.

With this in mind, Russia might accept whatever concessions that Assad might make to Turkiye and/or the Kurds as long as they contain the abovementioned terrorist threats and retain its two bases. Whatever happens, Russia was also just reminded of how unreliable deals with its adversaries are after Syria’s Turkish one just violated their prior Kremlin-brokered agreements just like how the West and Kiev earlier violated Minsk, thus reducing the chances that “conciliators” will convince Putin to compromise.

Those members of Russia’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) that want him to “finish the job” and achieve their country’s maximum objectives instead of settling for less are accordingly expected to further rise in influence as a result of what just happened in Syria. Trump and his team should take note of this development, correspondingly recalibrate whatever peace proposals they’re planning to make, and not disrespect Putin by demanding unacceptable concessions.