Turkey is trying to get closer to Israel

Turkey's Foreign Ministry said that representatives of Turkey and Israel, who met in London on Thursday, have agreed to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries. The warming of relations between Turkey and Israel started after the Turkish airforce shot down a Russian plane in November 2015. Turkey wants to enlist the support of its former opponent in the region against the background of deteriorating relations with Russia and the ambiguous position of the US.

The history of relations

Before Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s coming to power, Turkey and Israel were considered key allies in the region. Erdogan, first as prime minister and then president of the country, pursued a policy of local Islamization, which is reflected in his foreign policy. Turkey tried to use the Islamic factor to strengthen its position in the region, and their interaction with the Palestinian Islamic resistance led to a deterioration of relations with Israel. When Israeli commandos seized the Turkish ferry "Mavi Marmara" bound for blockaded Gaza, in 2010, relations between the two countries were frozen.

Why does Turkey need Israel?

Erdogan is eager to return to the old format of relations with Israel. Turkey, in December 2015, expressed its readiness to influence Hamas’ leadership, so that their activity would be tempered. The reason for Turkey’s behavior is the conflict with Russia and the US’ tough stance on the Syrian Kurds. Americans desire to use the Kurdish factor to secure their position in the region, but, however, this would bring separatist problems for Turkey. Israel is important as a strong political and military power in the region and as a possible source of hydrocarbons. The deposits of offshore oil and gas in Israel and Cyprus can make up for Turkey’s lost opportunities due to the incomplete Russian "Turkish Stream".

What does Turkey want from Israel?

However, this policy of rapprochement with Israel does not promise any prospects for Turkey. Israel is interested in normalizing relations with the country, but not at the expense of relations with Russia. Moreover, Israel, like the United States, supports the Syrian Kurds, and expects to use the Kurdish factor in its favor. The secular Kurdish pro-Israel government and the state will be able to balance the overall anti-Israeli Islamic Middle East in the future. In addition, Turkey is opposed to the current leadership of Egypt, which overthrew the pro-Turkish "Muslim Brotherhood” in 2013. Israel, on the contrary, supports president el-Sisi. Turkey is the not the only country where Israeli and Cypriot hydrocarbons can be exported to, however, the most likely partner in any future project is Greece, which is anti-Turkish. Supporting Turkey is not in Israel's interets, and will bring no benefits as a result. To restore the partnership with Israel, Turkey should abandon its current Islamist course and allow the US and the Zionist state to deal with the Kurds. Israel is interested in a weaker and compliant Turkey with a different non-Islamist president.

Two strategies

Erdogan is not willing to give up this futile strategy, and on April 1st, in the US, he even tried to negotiate with the leaders of the American Jewish community that have influenced both the United States and Israel, but he was greeted coldly. The international isolation of the Turkish leadership is a consequence of the collapse of neo-Ottoman policy. Its continuation can lead to the overheating of the imperial countries and at least the downfall of Erdogan’s regime. Turkey has only two choices: either make concessions to the United States and Israel, transforming itself into an instrument of influence in the Middle East, rejecting political Islam and returning to the former role of being an Atlanticist satellite; or adopt the Eurasian strategy of partnership with Russia, which traditionally has offered allies a lot of freedom.