Unrest In Serbia

The long-running anti-corruption movement in Serbia, which been accused by the government and Russia of being a Color Revolution front, recently escalated their tactics by setting fire to the ruling Serbian Progress Party’s offices. The authorities’ consequent crackdown prompted some Western commentators to wonder whether the EU might punish Serbia for this. Interestingly, the timing of this latest unrest coincides with President Aleksandar Vucic complying in part with Western pressure.

Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) reported in May that Serbia was arming Ukraine. They then confirmed in June that this trade still hasn’t stopped. Vucic later announced a supposed halt to all ammo exports and Prime Minister Duro Macut vowed that Serbia won’t arm Ukraine as long as he remains a member of the National Security Council. Their words shouldn’t be taken at face value, however, since they preceded the resumption of unrest and might have thus been a ploy to ensure Russia’s support.

Around the same time, European Integration Minister Nemanja Starovic revealed that Serbia would support sanctions against Russia “when EU membership is in sight”, to which Macut responded by promising that Serbia will never sanction Russia as long as he’s the head of the government. This was followed by a Serbian source informing Russia’s TASS in early August that Macut is plotting a purge of pro-Russian officials to facilitate future sanctions against Russia, which Vucic denied.

Also of relevance was Vucic pledging that he won’t amend the constitution to run for another term. This is pertinent since the protesters have been calling for early elections. Putting it all together, it can’t be ruled out that a radical regime change sequence might soon unfold in Serbia if Vucic capitulates to their electoral demands. A pro-Russian purge could proceed in parallel and Macut or another Western-friendly figure might replace Vucic to rule over an even more pro-Western government than before.

Vucic is already complying in part with Western pressure, however, as proven by SVR’s reports about Serbia arming Ukraine and Starovic’s revelation about the context in which Serbia would sanction Russia. It also deserves mentioning that Serbia voted against Russia at the UNGA over the Ukrainian Conflict and Chief of the General Staff Milan Mojsilovic told local media in January that “we terminated some (military) contracts (with Russia) and postponed some” due to the impact of Western sanctions.

One year ago in late August 2024, Vucic announced a $3 billion deal with France to purchase 12 French warplanes during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Belgrade, so Serbia’s pro-Western political drift under his leadership has also been matched by a pro-Western military one as well. Taken together, all these factors might lead one to believe that the West actually benefits from Vucic remaining in power and gradually taking these drifts to their predictable conclusion, but there’s more to it.

The West has become totalitarian in recent decades so its leaders don’t tolerate even the meekest dissent. For as pro-Western as Vucic is as proven by everything that’s been enumerated in this analysis thus far, he still hasn’t sanctioned Russia nor cut off all military cooperation with it, which enrages the West. He also accuses them of orchestrating what he’s described as the ongoing Color Revolution against him. All of this is unacceptable for an EU candidate country from the perspective of the bloc’s leadership.

Accordingly, while Vucic is indeed a very flawed leader who’s indisputably opposed by some patriotic political forces at home for legitimate reasons, he’s also arguably being targeted by the West at the same time through what can be described as a bonafide Color Revolution. The goal is simple and it’s to replace him with an even more pro-Western leader who’ll fully comply with their demands. In fact, his partial compliance thus far might have even emboldened them to ramp up their pressure in recent weeks.

After all, he’s already proven himself to be so pliable on Russia that the foreign orchestrators might have calculated that he’ll bend all the way to their demands if only they push him just a little bit more, otherwise they’ll just go all the way and attempt to have him prematurely replaced as president. Their Color Revolution advances these interconnected goals by both pressuring him even more on Russia and serving as the means for replacing him if that fails by demanding early elections to that end.

Getting Serbia to sanction Russia as soon as possible is important for the West since it can be spun as “another political victory over Putin” that outweighs whichever of Russia’s goals it achieves upon the end of the Ukrainian Conflict just like they’ve done with Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in NATO. The Western public, especially in Europe, must be made to believe that their rising living costs attributable to their governments’ anti-Russian sanctions have achieved something tangible to make it all worthwhile.

Their ruling elite fear their own, albeit this time purely indigenous, unrest if the conflict ends without the majority of the population adhering to this narrative. Symbolic goals like Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, Serbia sanctioning Russia, and/or transforming Bosnia’s Republika Srpska into a Western puppet could help make this more compelling. On that note, a few words should be said about the last-mentioned scenario, which coincides with the latest Color Revolution unrest in Serbia.

To oversimply, President Milorad Dodik was scandalously stripped of his position by one of the federation’s entities due to him refusing to implement the decrees of Bosnia’s foreign-imposed “high representative”, yet he still continues to perform his duties. Republika Srpska stands in the way of Bosnia’s NATO membership, so it follows that removing its Russian-friendly leader is the means to the end of it following in Finland’s and Sweden’s footsteps for the narrative reason that was just described.  

His Prime Minister subsequently resigned (perhaps for self-interested legal reasons), a new cabinet will thus be formed shortly, and referenda will soon be held on the legitimacy of the federation’s decision to strip Dodik of his position and Republika Srpska’s right to self-determination. If the situation deteriorates, which March’s analysis about “Serbs Under Pressure” details, then it would certainly be due to the Western elite wanting to score a symbolic victory against Russia that can be spun as explained.

The same can be said about Serbia’s situation, and in fact, yet another attempt might be underway to connect them both for maximum effect in the hopes of at least achieving their goals in one of them. Serbs must therefore remain alert since their two states are once again in the West’s crosshairs. Unlike in the past, if these latest plots succeed, their consequences might be irreversible (at least for quite some time) due to the historic global moment in which all of this is happening.