Turkey: arrests and protests

Hundreds have been arrested in Turkiye for violating the temporary ban on protests that was imposed in response to the detainment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on allegations of corruption and ties with the terrorist-designated PKK. Some of his associates were also rounded up too. This came just before the opposition CHP’s primary in which the party was expected to pick Imamoglu as its presidential candidate in the 2028 elections. The CHP therefore described this crackdown as a coup.

Although incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is technically ineligible to run again, he could still do so if early elections are called or the ruling AKP pushes through a constitutional amendment. It’s with these scenarios in mind that some suspect that the law enforcement action against Imamoglu is aimed at helping Erdogan secure yet another term. Regardless of the true motivation behind it and whatever might come next, this move at the very least makes it easier for the AKP to retain the presidency.

The opposition’s supporters are keenly aware of this and that’s why they’re defying the protest ban en masse to signal their dissident, demand that the authorities release Imamoglu, and pressure the government into resigning, though Erdogan declared that he “won’t give in” to any of their demands. The lira just hit an all-time low against the dollar, euro, and pound in a sign that investors are worried about what might come next given the large-scale political unrest that’s sweeping across Turkiye.

The authorities haven’t alleged so at the time of writing, but it’s possible that they might soon claim that a foreign actor is trying to crash their country’s economy, destabilize its political system, and ultimately advance the goal of regime change. The tensions between Turkiye and Israel over Gaza could even lead to Erdogan or one of his subordinates speculating about a Zionist plot. Such rhetoric might be meant to discredit the protests and distract the global public from the trigger event of Imamoglu’s detainment.

That said, there’s some truth to the notion that some foreign actors have an interest in weakening Turkiye from within through such means even if the opposition protests and currency drop are largely organic reactions to what just happened. Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkiye has evolved from a US client state to a power with tri-continental influence across Afro-Eurasia, which he’s achieved by prioritizing his country’s national interests as he sincerely understands them to be.

To that end, he’s cleverly balanced between the US, Russia, China, the EU, and regional countries, which even sometimes takes the form of playing them off against one another like he’s tried to do with Russia and the US. In the 22 years that he’s been in power, first as Prime Minister and now as President after changing the constitution to empower his new position, Erdogan has fended off many threats from the 2013 Gezi Park protests to the 2016 coup attempt and the PKK’s unconventional war against the state.

Precedent therefore suggests that he’ll weather the latest storm, but in any case, the unrest that’s rocking Turkiye naturally elicits schadenfreude from some foreign observers. If it continues, then Erdogan might feel compelled to authorize heavier-handed measures for quelling the protests before they descend into Color Revolution riots or even a terrorist insurgency by the most radicalized members of the opposition. What he likely doesn’t have to worry about, however, is the PKK exploiting the unrest.

That’s because its founder Abdullah Ocalan, who’s been imprisoned since 1999, called on the party to lay down arms and dissolve itself late last month. He pointed some of the socio-political reforms that Erdogan presided over to argue that his fellow Kurds no longer need to militantly fight for their rights. While that’s true, his historic decision might have been more influenced by the latest developments in Syria, which bode ill for the PKK’s future prospects as a terrorist-designated separatist group.

The collapse of the Assad government and rise to power of Turkish-backed HTS chief Ahmed al-Sharaa (previously known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) was followed by the new interim authorities imposing maximum pressure upon the Kurdish-ruled northeast to reintegrate into the national fold. A local PKK affiliate leads the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that presides over this majority-Arab region. They even carved out an autonomous administration there with US military backing over the years.

Turkiye considers this polity to be a terrorist entity and conventionally intervened in Syria three separate times in an attempt to neutralize the national security threat that it believes stems from there. The US’ military presence forced Turkiye to exercise restraint, but amidst rumors that Trump might pull those troops out and after early March’s agreement between the SDF and Damascus to restore the central government’s authority over the northeast, Turkiye might not hold back if it intervenes a fourth time.

Ocalan might have therefore realized that it’s time to throw in the towel and formally transition the PKK into a legal political movement instead of clinging to its unconventional warfare origins despite the odds if its neighboring base of operations is completely dismantled by Turkiye in the coming future. How this relates to the latest unrest is that authorities can focus more fully on quelling it than having to divide their attention between these protests and the PKK.

The timely removal of the PKK factor greatly reduces the chances that everything might spiral out of control, though there’s always the possibility that some warmongering breakaway PKK cells try to exploit everything by carrying out some terrorist attacks, but that still likely wouldn’t alter the course of events. The same holds true even if the lira continues crashing, with the only relevant variables being the AKP’s ability to retain unity and the continued loyalty of the security forces.

If either of these changes in any meaningful way, then a regime change might become more viable, whether by means of a coup or early elections in which the AKP’s lack of unity could lead to its loss. The CHP is more secular and pro-Western than the AKP so Turkiye’s foreign policy could drastically change as a result, but it’s premature to predict its form other than noting that relations with Russia might worsen. Anyhow, the CHP’s rule might not be stable since the AKP could mobilize its many supporters to protest.

The ruling party is genuinely popular at the grassroots level, especially in rural areas, so they could do the exact same thing that the CHP and its supporters are doing to either signal their own dissident towards whatever policies their opponents might promulgate or in response to what they might believe is a coup. About the last point, the AKP might soon claim that foreign actors have a hand in the latest unrest, which could be followed by large-scale protests across the country from their supporters.

In that scenario, any forthcoming concessions that the AKP might later make could be seen by them as having been done under duress, thus delegitimizing them in their eyes and further polarizing society. Wrapping everything up, it’s precisely society’s long-running polarization that’s led everything to this point, which is due to the AKP and CHP’s diametrically opposite worldviews. Another clash between them over Turkiye’s future was therefore inevitable but this latest one might not be their last.