TRIPP’s Consequences For Georgia
The newly announced “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) will have serious consequences for Georgia. The US sneakily replaced Russia’s role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, including its control over their planned economic corridor, which was to be guarded by the FSB per the final clause of their Moscow-mediated November 2022 ceasefire. The US, Turkiye, and other NATO countries can now expand their military influence all along Russia’s entire southern periphery.
TRIPP’s official purpose of pioneering a new regional economic corridor will foreseeably reduce the use of trans-Georgian railways and pipelines between Azerbaijan and Turkiye seeing as how it’s quicker, less costly, and more politically secure for them to conduct trade across their joint Armenian client state. The same goes for the Central Asian Republics’ and China’s trade with the EU through the “Middle Corridor”. Georgia’s lost revenue might then translate into less social expenditures and thus more political unrest.
This pressure could be alleviated by trying to reconquer Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two former Georgian regions over which the Five-Day War in 2008 was fought with Russia, but the ruling Georgian Dream has wisely refused to do so thus far for fear of following in Ukraine’s footsteps. Preferential loans could be offered to get it reconsider as well as Ukrainian-like military aid and promises not to orchestrate another Color Revolution. Continued refusal, however, could intensify Color Revolution pressure.
Several rounds of Color Revolution unrest were already repelled, but future rounds might have a better chance of succeeding if more increasingly destitute people join in the event that the economy worsens. There’s also always the risk that members of the so-called “Georgian Legion” might return from Ukraine to carry out terrorist attacks, even false-flag ones, for replicating the “EuroMaidan” scenario in Tbilisi. Georgia’s ironically US-inspired foreign agents law might thus not be of much help if that happens.
Simply put, the economic downturn that TRIPP might catalyze in Georgia could tip the balance between foreign-backed “Color Revolutionaries”, the security services, and Georgian Dream. This might not happen right away, but it’s credible enough of a scenario for the authorities to take seriously. Color Revolutions succeed when key members of the political and security elite defect. Economic troubles and possible “Georgian Legion”-led terrorism could exacerbate preexisting intra-state rifts to this end.
From Russia’s perspective, Georgian Dream’s capitulation or replacement with an ultra-nationalist pro-Western regime that then threatens Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead to another war. This could even be timed for another conflict with Ukraine if Russia hypothetically doesn’t achieve its maximum goals in the current one. The rapidly militarizing EU could make Ukraine a more formidable opponent the second time around while already-militarized Turkiye and Azerbaijan could do the same for Georgia.
It's therefore imperative that Russia does everything it can to ensure that Georgian Dream retains its pragmatic foreign policy and isn’t ousted via another potential Color Revolution plot otherwise Russia could very well face a two-front proxy war with NATO in the future. Comprehensively expanding trade ties with Georgia could be the first step in this direction in order to preemptively avert the possibility of a TRIPP-induced economic downturn fueling more foreign-orchestrated regime change riots.
That’s already happening according to TASS: “The trade turnover between Georgia and Russia reached nearly $1.3 bln in the first six months of 2025, marking a 7% increase compared to the same period in 2024… Exports from Georgia to Russia in January-June exceeded $332 mln, reflecting a 2% year-on-year decline, while imports from Russia amounted to over $950 mln, an increase of 10.5%.” This makes Russia Georgia’s third-largest trade partner, the US its second ($1.3+ bln), and Turkiye its first ($1.4 bln).
More can be done as proven by Georgia’s yawning trade deficit with Russia. The Kremlin would thus do well to brainstorm ways to increase imports from Georgia in order to support local businesses if TRIPP does indeed lead to an economic downturn with time. Russia should also realize that it’s competing with Turkiye in this respect and falling behind could raise the chances of Georgian Dream either capitulating to the earlier mentioned pressure campaign or being replaced by a very unfriendly regime.
“Democratic Security”, which refers to counter-Color Revolution policies, involves much more than just disbanding riots. This emerging field of security also has important economic components that vary in detail depending on the country but share the common ground of attempting to preemptively avert the possibility of a critical mass of dissatisfied people being weaponized by external forces for regime change. Helping to maintain Georgia’s economic strength therefore helps maintain political stability.
Likewise, “Democratic Security” also aims to politically resolve frozen conflicts, which can serve as the pretexts for assembling a critical mass of anti-government rioters as well as co-opting dissatisfied state officials (whether to coerce a geopolitical pivot or get them to defect during Color Revolutions). This is admittedly a herculean diplomatic task to accomplish in the Georgian context since Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries and has vowed to defend them again if needed.
Their people understandably don’t trust Georgia and cherish their hard-earned independence, especially Abkhazia, which at times flexes its independence in ways that could challenge their country’s shared interests with Russia such as during the latest round of unrest in late 2024. Reincorporation into Georgia, even through a confederal solution, therefore likely isn’t realistic at least for the foreseeable future. Even so, a Russian-mediated customs union between them could be a small step in the right direction.
The overarching problem, both back in 2008 and still to this day, is Georgia’s official goal of joining NATO. Even though Georgian Dream appears to have informally shelved these plans for the time being in response to the last several rounds of Western-backed Color Revolution attempts, they still remain a very serious latent threat to Russia’s security. If there’s ever any political solution to its frozen conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it would have to include Georgia formally abandoning this ambition.
Therein lies the dilemma, however, since even tabloid speculation about Georgia (whether under Georgian Dream or whoever else) doing so much as considering this as one of several possible compromises would lead to hysteria among the most radical pro-Western members of its population. Another Color Revolution would certainly be attempted to overthrow the authorities and Western pressure could unprecedentedly intensify to coerce them into explicitly renouncing this possibility.
The failure of this two-pronged campaign could then lead to crippling sanctions and possibly, in the worst-case scenario, a joint Turkish-Azeri invasion to depose the incumbent government and ensure that these frozen conflicts are never politically resolved and thus remain points of pressure against Russia. Therefore, even if it proves impossible to politically resolve them, Russia must at the very least ensure that ultra-nationalist Western-backed forces hostile to its interests don’t ever come back to power there.
Russia can only do so much as was explained, but comprehensively expanding bilateral trade would greatly help to alleviate the bottom-up pressure that pragmatic forces in Georgia (whether Georgian Dream or whoever might eventually succeed them) might come under with time due to TRIPP. If a critical mass of newly disaffected people forms as a result of an economic downturn caused in part by that megaproject, then it might precede a successful Color Revolution push that reignites war with Georgia.
Russia hitherto avoided a two-front proxy war with NATO in Ukraine and Georgia only due to the latter’s ruling party not wanting to sacrifice their country for the West like Zelensky did his. If the Georgian government changes, especially due to foreign-weaponized unrest, then Russia could indeed once again face the threat of a two-front proxy war with NATO in the future. Unlike in 2008, Georgia might receive Ukrainian-like support from Turkiye and Azerbaijan, who might even become its mutual defense allies.
Those two identify as “one nation, two states”, and they’re poised to turn Armenia into their joint client state as a result of Pashinyan betraying Russia through TRIPP. From their perspective, Georgia should one day become their joint client state too in order to complete their “conquest of the (South) Caucasus”, which could then threaten Russia’s North Caucasus or at least provoke a security dilemma. This could be avoided if Georgia remains sovereign with Russian (economic) help and retains pragmatic ties with it.
Populists like Georgian Dream have to deliver or they’ll lose power so any economic downturn caused by TRIPP could eventually lead to their ouster even if only at the polls. They’re popular for not getting Georgia involved in another war with Russia, but voters might forget this sometime after the Ukrainian Conflict ends and if the economy weakens. Any hypothetical compromises on Russia’s maximum goals in Ukraine might also embolden Georgian ultra-nationalists into thinking that “Russia is weak”.
What all of this means is that Georgia will remain geostrategically significant to Russia, the West, and the emerging Turkic Bloc (Turkiye and Azerbaijan). TRIPP could place it on the trajectory of another Color Revolution attempt, but this time driven by tangible economic factors than abstract fears about a piece of legislation, thus raising its chances of success. That scenario could lead to another Russian-Georgian War, which might be timed for another Ukrainian Conflict, so Moscow must do everything to avoid it.