Mongolia’s Recalibrated Balancing Act

President Putin’s trip to Mongolia this week to attend events commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Battle of Khalkin Gol against Imperial Japan brought global media attention to this landlocked country. It’s a signatory of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC) so it’s obligated to arrest him due to the politicized warrant that was issued in early 2023. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov shrugged off these concerns, however, saying that “we aren’t worried.”

Mongolia used to be part of the Qing Empire for several centuries until declaring independence in 1911, after which it then closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Although ties with China greatly improved after the USSR’s dissolution, so much so that it’s now Mongolia’s top trade partner by far, there are concerns that Chinese influence might one day impede its sovereignty. Some of these are hyped up by Western-backed figures and organizations, but others are genuine and have greatly influenced its foreign policy.

The “Third Neighbor Policy” was formed as a result and aims to cultivate strategic partnerships with nearby countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea alongside more distant ones like India and the US in order to alleviate dependence on its only Chinese and Russian neighbors. This is a sound policy in principle so long as it remains focused on political and economic ties, such as arranging talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its rivals, but its military dimension is concerning.

Independent Mongolian expert Bair Danzanov published a detailed report about this in June for the Russian Academy of Sciences’ online journal titled “Mongolia-USA: a paradoxical military partnership?”, which is worth reading for those who aren’t aware of how close they’ve become. Mongolia has a partnership with NATO and is part of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, thus leading some to wonder exactly what it hopes to gain from these ties, especially considering prevailing New Cold War tensions.

Mongolia’s small military is incapable of threatening Russia or China, but those two aren’t a threat to it since neither has any territorial claims to Mongolia, so it’s a mystery why it’s developing such close military ties with the US. One explanation is that the US initially thought that it could turn Mongolia into a wedge between Russia and China, which Mongolia might have agreed to consider early after the end of the Old Cold War, perhaps in exchange for foreign investment into its struggling economy.

As time passed and its two neighbors became stronger, however, these illusions were dispelled but military ties might have by then attained their own momentum that continues to this day. From the American perspective, the symbolism of cultivating such relations with a country between Russia and China appeals to policymakers, who consider it some sort of victory. From the Mongolian perspective, some in the state and society alike might imagine that this “deters” those two, hence their support for it.

Nevertheless, Mongolia also agreed to serve as a transit state for the planned Power of Siberia II pipeline between Russia and China, which it wouldn’t have done if it was a Western puppet. About that megaproject, Russia and China have yet to agree on pricing despite several years of negotiations, and that’s likely why Mongolia didn’t include the pipeline in its newly approved action plan till 2028. Putin is expected to explain Russia’s views on everything during his visit to reassure Mongolia of its intentions.

There’s also the subject of trilateral rail cooperation to discuss as well after he spoke about this during last fall’s Belt & Road Forum for International Cooperation. Joint mineral exploration will probably be on the agenda too following an announcement in mid-August that they’re compiling a list of such resource sites. Russia has world-class extraction technology while Mongolia has some of the world’s largest mineral resources, which comprise most of its exports, so they’re complementary partners in this regard.

Rio Tinto is already very active in the country, but Mongolia would do well by involving more Russian companies in its mining operations in order to prevent dependence on that Western one, and Ulaanbaatar seems sincere in this judging by its desire to defy the ICC to host Putin. This observation segues back to its “Third Neighbor Policy”, which appears to be in the midst of recalibration due to prevailing New Cold War tensions as evidenced by Mongolia hosting Putin.

Its new coalition government, which Danzanov also analyzed here, is risking the West’s ire by doing so. This wouldn’t have been possible had the permanent members of its military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) not agreed with it, thus suggesting that they’ve spent some time thinking about reforming their country’s foreign policy in light of the new global conditions. After all, President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh could easily fly to Moscow for talks, yet instead Putin is flying to him.

This symbolism is arguably more significant than Mongolia’s military ties with the US since it shows that the latter haven’t influenced its policy towards Russia unlike what some might have thought. The fact that their talks are taking place in Mongolia in spite of that country’s membership in the ICC and after that body’s politicized warrant for Putin’s arrest is just as important as their substance. Quite clearly, Mongolia wanted to show the world that it stands with Russia, and everyone is now aware of it.

Folks on the home front might now no longer be as worried about China’s outsized economic influence one day impeding their country’s sovereignty since they were just reminded that Russia is a friendly counterweight to this in some respects. As for those abroad, there’s now no longer any question about Mongolia being a truly sovereign state since it bravely defied the US in spite of close military ties with it. These outcomes will facilitate the recalibration of Mongolia’s balancing act if it has the will to go further.

It's one thing to make a statement by hosting Putin in the previously described context and another to make good on his visit by tangibly strengthening strategic relations with Russia. Even in the absence of progress on the Power of Siberia II pipeline, Russia is still a very attractive partner for Mongolia for reasons of simple geographic convenience and close historical ties. It can help extract and develop Mongolian minerals while continuing to train Mongolian experts in Russian universities.

Closer railway cooperation can relieve Mongolia’s export dependence on China, which would play well among some segments of its population while possibly appealing to some American policymakers too who prefer prioritizing China’s containment over Russia’s. To be absolutely clear, Russia is fully against the US’ containment policies no matter who they’re directed against, but fulfilling the aforementioned function might convince some hawks not to destabilize Mongolia in the future.

The US plans to “Pivot (back) to Asia” upon the inevitable end of its proxy war on Russia through Ukraine, whenever that may be, and Mongolia’s “deep state” might have wanted to get ahead of the curve by proactively relying more on Russia to balance China. This could have been done with the intent of preemptively neutralizing the appeal of anti-Chinese slogans by Western Color Revolution agents who might be activated to sow unrest along China’s northern border as part of a “controlled chaos” strategy.

Comprehensively strengthening relations with Russia at this particular point in time might therefore be meant to achieve this goal of recalibrating its foreign policy much more than to defy the ICC with all the Western wrath that might ensue just for the sake of making a statement about its sovereignty. It’s sensible to try to attain something tangible if such risks are being taken, though it of course remains to be seen exactly how far Mongolia will go and whether Western pressure might complicate this goal.

There’ll of course be some in the US who are furious at Mongolia for defying the ICC even though their own country isn’t a signatory to the Rome Statute, and they might want to punish Mongolia for making the West look foolish. Sanctioning it isn’t realistic since that would just push Mongolia closer to Russia, though the short-term economic consequences could serve as the pretext for Color Revolution unrest. Even so, it’s an unlikely scenario, and a tongue-lashing might be all that could come from them.

It’ll be interesting to monitor the extent to which Mongolia recalibrates its balancing act after Putin’s visit considering that its “deep state” is knowingly risking Western opprobrium by hosting him in defiance of the ICC’s arrest warrant. Even if it ultimately gets cold feet and doesn’t go through with much of what was written in this analysis, it still deserves praise for what it did after BRICS member South Africa decided against hosting him a year ago under heavy Western pressure.