Israel, Iran, And The US

Israel bombed Iran last Friday in a three-wave attack that reportedly targeted its air defense systems and other military-related infrastructure in response to Iran’s “Operation True Promise II” from early October. That Iranian missile strike against Israel was in retaliation for Israel assassinating Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran over the summer and then Hezbollah leader Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut in late September. It was Iran’s second direct attack against Israel after the first one from mid-April.

“Operation True Promise I” was retaliation for Israel bombing the Iranian Consulate in Damascus and was responded to by Israel carrying out a very low-scale attack against Iran. Israel’s latest attack was much larger but was still considered by most observers to be restrained. Reports circulated in the run-up alleging that Israel planned to target Iran’s critical infrastructure, including its sole nuclear power plant and oil refineries, but then other reports circulated alleging that the US was strongly against this.

The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and others subsequently cited unnamed administration sources to report on how the US supposedly influenced Israel to calibrate and limit its attack. Both aforementioned outlets also claimed independently of one another’s reporting that the US then agreed to deploy one of its seven Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to Israel before its latest attack after Israel agreed to the US’ requests. This was supposedly meant to deter Iran from a full-fledged response.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu’s office denied that the US influenced the targets that Israel struck, but there are reasons to believe that these reports before and after the attack are accurate. To explain, the US is very worried about a significant escalation that could spiral out of control into an all-out war which puts the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) between Israel and Iran to the test. That scenario would be disastrous for the US’ grand strategic interests.

The expected disruption of regional energy exports would cripple the global economy, thus leading to its top trade partners entering into a major recession that would prompt one in the US too since they’d no longer be able purchase much of its export-dependent economy’s goods and services. Even worse, the US is considered to be led by a collective leadership right now and has been for a while due to its nominal Commander-in-Chief’s dementia, which is a disadvantageous position in which to wage a war.

It's difficult to imagine the US not retaliating if Iran strikes its regional military assets as part of the previously mentioned all-out war scenario like would probably happen in that event, and the same goes for it sitting aside if Israel’s existence is seriously threatened. The aforesaid sequence of events could enter into motion if Israel crosses Iran’s indisputable red lines by crippling its economy through strikes on its critical infrastructure and even risking a nuclear disaster by targeting its only such power plant.

There’s a school of thought which claims that Bibi is so ideologically crazed that he’s willing to risk all the above in order to manipulate the US into destroying Iran on Israel’s behalf and at its behest through an overwhelming first strike that would greatly reduce the chance that MAD is put to the test. For as compelling as arguments in support of that view might seem, the fact of the matter is that Bibi ultimately didn’t cross Iran’s indisputable red lines that were outlined and instead restrained himself.

Outgoing US President Joe Biden, who serves as the figurehead for the US’ collective leadership, also said that he hopes that there won’t be any further escalation from either side. Those that are behind him not only want to avoid the worst-case scenarios that were outlined, but they also know how unpopular Israel is with many Americans nowadays, especially Democrats. Pandering too much to it might push Muslims in swing states to either sit out the election or vote for third parties in protest.

It’s possible that the Biden Administration’s failure to rein Israel in during the early stages of its Gaza campaign that’s since escalated into a regional Israeli-Resistance War with disastrous humanitarian consequences for West Asian Muslims might in hindsight be why Donald Trump is re-elected next week. The electoral context therefore can’t be ignored when analyzing US policy towards Israel’s latest attack against Iran as well as associated Israeli and Iranian military calculations.

A significant regional escalation that spirals out of control before the elections could easily hand the presidency back to Trump, who’s campaigned on a platform of ending all foreign wars and not embroiling America in any future ones, hence another reason for the Biden Administration’s caution. There was also the suspicious leaking of US intelligence on alleged Israeli plans in the days before the latest attack, which might either have been done by a dissident or on purpose to show Israel who’s boss.

From Israel’s perspective, the Biden Administration isn’t anywhere near as reliable as most prior ones, yet Israel also didn’t want to wait until mid-January when the comparatively much friendly Trump possibly returns to power to retaliate against Iran for “Operation True Promise II”. That’s over three months since Iran’s latest attack, or framed differently, over one-quarter of a year, which is twice as long as Iran waited before retaliating against Israel for assassinating Haniyeh in Tehran.

The interim period would predictably be characterized by increasingly feverish speculation about Israeli weakness that could further demoralize its population and thus increase pressure on Bibi to agree to a compromise for ending the regional Israeli-Resistance War or at least its Gaza component. Trump also might not be re-elected, thus leading to more of the same US unreliability from what would then be the Harris Administration that would likely also be led by the same collective leadership as Biden’s.

Waiting over a month to retaliate against Iran would also look bad from Israel’s viewpoint, which is why it wanted to attack before then in order to signal that “Operation True Promise II” was unacceptable. Any longer could embolden Iran into thinking that Israel is weaker than it is, and this could possibly lead to an “Operation True Promise III” even without another major Israeli provocation preceding it. Like Iran, Israel also has some indisputable red lines that it doesn’t want crossed since it prefers not to test MAD either.

Iran had signaled through the scale of “Operation True Promise II” and media statements that it could destroy all of Israel’s critical infrastructure if its own indisputable red lines are crossed, but hawkish elements within its leadership might successfully argue for a first strike. The only possible way to deter them was for Israel to retaliate within a month of “Operation True Promise II” and therefore before the elections instead of waiting till after Harris wins or even later for Trump to return to power if he wins.

Moreover, Trump soured on Bibi after the Israeli leader congratulated Biden after 2020’s scandalous presidential elections, and he also said that Bibi “rightly has been criticized” for Hamas’ 7 October attack. Bibi might therefore not have wanted to wait over one-quarter of a year before retaliating against Iran in case Trump wins since it’s possible that Trump might no longer be as friendly towards Israel as before. He and those around him talk tough against Iran, but they might not want to wage war against it.

Trump is a businessman who cares more about cutting deals and keeping trade going, plus he has an axe to grind against Bibi despite how beholden he is to Zionist donors, so it can’t be taken for granted that he’d back Israel up if it provoked a significant escalation with Iran in order to draw the US in on its side. At the same time, however, Iran sees everything very differently. It’ll never forgive him for authorizing Major General Qassem Soleimani’s assassination and pulling out of the JCPOA nuclear deal.

His “maximum pressure” strategy inflicted a lot of economic hardship on the Iranian people that in turn shifted some of their perceptions and thus indirectly made the election of the “moderate”/“reformist” Masoud Pezeshkian possible following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s unexpected death in May. A lot of the regional trouble that Iran finds itself in nowadays can be traced back to the Trump Administration. Although Biden’s still backs Israel, it’s also tried to pressure Israel and reopen some dialogue with Iran.

This background helps place into context its military calculations after Israel’s latest attack. Iran reaffirmed its right to respond in self-defense, but it might also wait until after the elections in order to avoid facilitating Trump’s possible return to office if it sets the previously described worst-case scenarios into motion, whether inadvertently or deliberately. That said, there are also hawkish elements within its own leadership just like there are within Israel’s, and they might rationalize the need for a first strike.

The same goes for Israel’s, thus meaning that the greatest threat of a significant escalation spiring out of control into an all-out war with unprecedented global consequences are each side’s respective hawks, who their own governments and the other’s comparatively more moderate elements have to manage. The US also has a role to play in this too since it doesn’t want either doing anything that could embolden the other’s hawks and bring about the worst-case scenario that it has a self-interest in avoiding.

The best-case scenario, the odds of which cannot confidently be assessed due to the opacity of all three’s policymaking bureaucracies, is therefore that Iran only responds to Israel’s latest attack indirectly via its Resistance Axis allies instead of carrying out a symmetrical or outmatched retaliation. It doesn’t matter whether this is before or after the US’ presidential elections since Biden, Harris, and Trump would be pressured to get involved in the hostilities if its regional forces are attacked or Israel faces destruction.