Iranian-Israeli Crisis

The long-running tensions between Iran and Israel have exploded into an unprecedented crisis. These two regional adversaries, which consider the other to be an aspiring regional hegemon and an existential threat, exchanged tit-for-tat strikes twice since October 7^th but they managed to contain the escalation. That’s not the case though with this latest crisis after Israel launched a devastating sneak attack on Iran late last week on the pretext of stopping its allegedly secret nuclear weapons program.

Given the fog of war as well as each side’s interests in downplaying their adversaries’ damage to military and strategic sites, it’s impossible to confidently assess the damage that was inflicted, whether by Israel during the first round, Iran during its retaliation, or both during their ongoing exchanges. Nonetheless, it’s plain to see that they’ve harmed each other like never before, and the growing costs of this conflict risk it spiraling further out of control if Israel resorts to nukes and/or Iran strikes regional US bases.

Iran accuses the US of helping Israel orchestrate its devastating sneak attack, which the US denies, and Israeli officials have boasted to the media that Trump supposedly helped deceive Iran through duplicitous diplomacy by feigning sincerity in reaching a deal while actually leading it on all along. For his part, Trump claimed that Israel attacked Iran on day 61 of the 60-day deadline that he gave Iran for reaching another nuclear deal, and his explicit support of Israel suggests that he wasn’t caught off guard.

That doesn’t necessarily mean that he didn’t truly want to reach a deal with Iran, however, just that he didn’t mind if Israel punished Iran after his 60-day deadline expired if a deal wasn’t reached by then. The reason why one hasn’t yet been agreed to is because Iran considers the US’ reported demands to be excessive. That’s not surprising since the US isn’t known for fair deals. Letting Israel degrade Iran’s military and strategic capabilities can thus be seen as a means of coercing these concessions from it.

If that was the plan – sincerely try to negotiate a lopsided deal with Iran and then stand back as Israel attacks it if one isn’t reached before the US’ 60-day deadline expires so as to then impose an even more lopsided one onto a weakened Iran – then it’s not proceeding smoothly. Iran has indeed inflicted quite a lot of damage onto Israel judging from available footage, the exact details and extent of which can’t be confidently assessed, prompting Israel to reportedly request the US’ direct participation in the war.

The US is therefore caught in a dilemma: it can either stand aside as the war escalates, with the potential consequence being that Israel nukes Iran out of desperation and/or Iran attacks regional US bases out of desperation, or attempt to preempt the aforesaid through a “shock-and-awe” campaign against Iran. At stake is the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China, which would be derailed if the US is dragged into a major war, and the unity of MAGA’s diverse coalition.

As for the first, either of the abovementioned consequences (Israel nuking Iran and/or Iran attacking regional US bases) could embroil the US in West Asia, the former through “reconstruction” and “nation-building” efforts afterwards and the latter through all the costs that involvement in the war would entail. Regarding the second, MAGA dissidents could defect from the coalition in protest, which might doom the Republicans’ 2026 midterm prospects. The best way to break this Gordian knot is through diplomacy.

Therein lies the importance of Trump’s latest call with Putin, who offered to mediate if the opportunity arises, but there are very real limits to what Russia can achieve. While Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran’s response will end if Israel stops bombing his country, and then Iran would be ready for an agreement guaranteeing that it won’t build nukes, Israel said that it won’t stop bombing until it eliminates what it considers to the existential threat posed by Iran (including its nuclear program).

Accordingly, if Trump truly wants to extricate the US from the dilemma into which it’s been placed by him letting Israel bomb Iran in the first place after the expiry of his 60-day deadline, then he must pressure Israel into stopping its bombing as soon as possible. If he either doesn’t want to, is unable to, or directly involves the US in this war (with or without Iran first bombing regional US bases), then the window for Russian mediation will close and the consequences that the US needs to avoid will ensue.

Russia’s interests would also be indelibly harmed if the Iranian-Israeli crisis spirals out of control. Iran logistically facilitates Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor to India and could help Russia manage the global oil and especially gas markets if its resource potential is unleashed. Its destruction by war, a pro-Western regime change, and/or “Balkanization” if militant Arab, Azeri, Baloch, and/or Kurd minorities exploit the latest events could therefore greatly threaten these far-reaching strategic plans.

Meanwhile, Putin declared in 2019 that “Russians and Israelis have ties of family and friendship. This is a true common family; I can say this without exaggeration. Almost 2 million Russian speakers live in Israel. We consider Israel a Russian-speaking country.” From his viewpoint, the damage that Iran continues to inflict on Israel – while legally justified in self-defense according to him and his officials – puts members of his beloved Russian World in danger, whose security he’d prefer to ensure if he can.

The longer that the war goes on for, the higher the chances of something even more dramatic happening than has already transpired, which doesn’t have to include what was earlier warned about (Israel nuking Iran and/or Iran attacking regional US bases). As was already warned about, Iran might experience another regime change push and/or be forced to fend off “Balkanization” threats that are more serious than ever, especially if neighbors like Azerbaijan ramp up their meddling or even threaten to intervene.

Israel could erupt in large-scale protests if the war drags on, basic services are cut off for a prolonged period, and members of its armed forces and/or intelligence services walk off the job. Even if none of this happens, the physical and psychological damage that Iranian missile strikes could inflict on Israel and its people might change the country in unpredictable ways, which could eventually have second-order consequences for the Palestinians and neighboring countries. That might reshape regional dynamics.

Educated conjecture about the course and consequences of the Iranian-Israeli crisis aside, one thing is probably for certain, and it’s that neither Russia nor China will directly intervene on Iran’s side. They politically support it, and one or both might even provide intelligence, logistical, or even military aid, but they aren’t likely to risk World War III with the US over Iran. Russia won’t (yet?) risk it over Ukraine and China won’t (yet?) risk it over Taiwan, after all, which are much more integral to their interests.

For as disappointed some might be about this observation, they should remember that BRICS and the SCO within which all three are members aren’t military alliances so neither of them has any obligation to intervene in Iran’s support. That doesn’t mean that their interests wouldn’t be harmed by Iran’s potential defeat however it’s defined (capitulating to a lopsided deal with the US, large-scale physical destruction by Israel, regime change, and/or “Balkanization”), just that they won’t go to war over it.

In terms of the bigger picture, the Iranian-Israeli crisis does indeed have contours of a New Cold War proxy war between the world’s multipolar and unipolar forces, but that compelling interpretation is admittedly an oversimplification given Russia and China’s pretty decent relations with Israel. Israel is most definitely more in the Western/American/unipolar camp than the non-Western/Eurasian/multipolar one, but it also isn’t a threat to Russia and China like NATO and AUKUS are.

This additional observation should hopefully add further clarity to why Russia and China are unlikely to directly intervene in Iran’s support against Israel at the potential risk of sparking World War III with the US. The New Cold War proxy contours of this latest crisis veritably exist, but they don’t appear to influence either of those two’s policymaking to the point where they’d jeopardize their immediate national security interests in the way that some of their enthusiasts want them to.

To wrap everything up, this escalating conflict has enormous stakes for the global systemic transition and is incredibly dangerous due to the increasing likelihood that it might spiral out of control, but its outcome can’t yet (as of Monday morning Moscow time when this analysis was written) be predicted. What’s most important is that observers are aware of the larger dynamics at play and the interests of all relevant stakeholders in order to produce their own frameworks for better explaining everything.