The Iranian-Israeli Crisis
Long-running tensions between Iran and Israel, which previously took the form of Israel regularly bombing the IRGC and its allies like Hezbollah in Syria, dramatically worsened since the start of the latest Israeli-Hamas War. The most recent development at the time of writing is Israel assassinating Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of July. He was attending newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration and was killed by an explosive projectile that hit his guesthouse.
The whole world is bracing for Iran’s retaliation, which might very well already come to pass by the time that this piece is published, but the latest drama has distracted many observers from the larger context of the Iranian-Israeli Crisis. It’s taking place as the global systemic transition to multipolarity, which predated the start of Russia’s special operation but was unprecedentedly accelerated by it, continues unfolding and affecting literally every corner of the world.
The US doesn’t want to accept the inevitable decline of its unipolar hegemony, ergo why it’s waging its proxy war on Russia through Ukraine with a view towards delaying this transition for as long as possible. Its Israeli ally, which benefited from the previous unipolar system, is also waging a proxy war on its top Iranian rival. This predated Hamas’ sneak attack on 7 October but was also unprecedentedly accelerated by it, having now expanded from Syria to the Lebanese, Yemeni, and even Iranian theaters.
Just like Russia champions a different world order from the US’, so too does Iran champion a different regional one from Israel, and the Islamic Republic’s support of Hamas and other members of the Resistance Axis has been indispensable to speeding up multipolar processes in West Asia. These aforementioned trends complement those that Russia is leading in Eurasia as a whole and the world more broadly, which also align with China’s as well to create an imperfect trilateral axis of sorts.
To be clear, some differences still exist between these three strategic partners, such as Russia’s support of the UAE over Iran amidst their Gulf island dispute and its similar such support for India’s territorial claims vis-à-vis Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin amidst the Kashmir dispute. China also supports the UAE over Iran in that regional dispute, while neither China nor Iran recognize September 2022’s referenda whereby four former Ukrainian regions joined Russia, nor do they recognize Crimea’s reunification either.
Be that as it may, none of them have let those differences obstruct cooperation with the others in advance of their shared multipolar goals, thus explaining why they can be considered complementary poles of that emerging order. The relevance of this insight to the Iranian-Israeli Crisis is that Russia and China are unlikely to leave the Islamic Republic hanging if a full-scale war with the self-professed Jewish State breaks out, though that also doesn’t mean that they’ll directly involve themselves either.
Although Russian-Israeli ties remain cordial despite their sharp disagreements over Gaza and Ukraine, as proven by Israel not sanctioning Russia or sending its Patriots to Ukraine via the US while Russia doesn’t even symbolically designate Israel as an “unfriendly state”, they still represent different worldviews. Russia is a multipolar champion while Netanyahu is clinging to the US’ declining unipolar hegemony and risking World War III with Iran out of desperation to retain Israel’s previously leading regional position.
To that end, Russia envisages West Asia one day being at peace with itself through a fair resolution of the Palestinian Question in line with associated UNSC Resolutions so that everyone can prosper, while Israel wants to continue its illegal occupation while dividing-and-ruling the region to its selfish benefit. In other words, Russia wants a truly “New Middle East”, whereas the “New Middle East” that Israel wants is exactly what the American neocons have spent decades trying to create through their meddling.
Although their philosophies are contradictory, this hasn’t led to serious friction between them apart from harsh rhetoric, which is due to each having an interest in keeping their ties cordial. If Israel crossed Russia’s red lines on Ukraine, then Russia could let Syria use its S-300s to defend itself instead of continuing to abstain for de-escalation reasons, not to mention arming the Resistance Axis. Likewise, Israel could arm Ukraine with offensive weapons if Russia crosses its red line via the preceding actions.
This status quo held up until now but is at risk of finally breaking as a result of the latest escalation cycle brought about Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran. Any overmatched Israeli retaliation to however Iran ultimately responds to that provocation risks pushing the region to the brink of World War III, especially if the US gets involved. Iran is ready for that though due to its embrace of Shia Islam’s martyrdom concept, though it would of course prefer for everything not to get to that point if possible.
It's here where recent unconfirmed reports about the dispatch of Russian military equipment to Iran should be mentioned. Keeping in mind what was earlier assessed about Russia’s reluctance to cross Israel’s red lines by arming the Resistance Axis in ways that could threaten its national security, it’s possible that only defensive systems like air defense and electronic warfare ones were sent there. That could help Iran blunt Israel’s (and possibly also the US’) follow-up strikes after its promised retaliation.
By doing so and thus ideally mitigating their damage, that could help maintain the regional balance of power, and it could also keep the escalation cycle under control by reducing the pressure upon Iran to respond (whether in general or especially in an overwhelming way that risks bringing everything to the brink). At the same time, however, this speculative defensive support wouldn’t cross Israel’s red line of threatening its national security and could therefore keep ties their ties manageable.
Russia’s grand strategic goal of continuing to promote multipolarity processes across the world would be ruined if Iran was greatly weakened by Israeli and/or US strikes, let alone if World War II breaks out over the Iranian-Israeli Crisis, which is why its interests would be served through the abovementioned means. Arming Iran and/or its Resistance Axis allies with high-tech offensive arms could risk provoking massive first-strikes from Israel and/or the US that might then lead to the larger war that Russia wants to avoid.
Having said that, there’s also a certain logic inherent in doing so, namely to assist Iran in decisively defeating Israel while the latter is weakened by the last ten months of war in Gaza instead of perpetuating their crisis and giving Israel time to recover to fight better in the future. This thought process resembles that of some in Russia who believe that their country should decisively defeat the West in Ukraine instead of freeze the conflict and give the West time to recover like Israel could.
World War III could be sparked by the Russian-Western proxy war in Ukraine or the Iranian-Israeli one in West Asia, with Russia and Iran being on the side of multipolarity while the US and Israel are one the side of unipolarity. This observation reaffirms the epistemological nature of those conflicts in and of themselves as well as their role in this historic moment of the global systemic transition. The outcome of both will determine whether multipolarity marches ahead at full speed or is suddenly delayed for a bit.