India and China now need to think big, cement Kazan spirit

India and China celebrated 75 years of their diplomatic engagement with an affirmative call by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the time had arrived for the two countries to shape the global agenda, based on active consultations and coordination.

In a short but pithy message to Indian President Draupadi Murmu, President Xi colourfully foresaw the next phase of Sino-Indian relationship as a tango between the Dragon and the Elephant—signature animals that symbolize the two heavyweight Asian neighbours.

President Xi stressed that Beijing and New Delhi should work more closely together.

More significantly, the Chinese President spotlighted that the duo should find ways to coexist peacefully—an unambiguous message of ruling out war as an option to settle differences. Firewalling conflict, he stressed that the two countries should share joint responsibility to safeguard peace in the border areas.

Then elaborating on a positive and ambitious shared vision, the Chinese leader expressed his personal readiness to start a conversation with India to shape the global agenda by pursuing deep communication and coordination.

Xi’s forward-looking message, capped similar sentiments that were earlier expressed by the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. Addressing his signature press conference during China’s famed two sessions—an annual meeting of  two key political bodies of the of the Communist Party of China (CPC)—Wang surprised India with an unexpected offer.

China’s veteran  top diplomat advocated that China and India should jointly reach out to the Global South and counter “hegemonism”—a veiled statement of intent to resist negative forays by western powers.

“As important members of the Global South, we have the responsibility to take the lead in opposing hegemonism and power politics,” Wang asserted.

The bullish mood in China on the bright future of Sino-Indian partnership followed a highly consequential  BRICS summit in Kazan. On the sidelines of the conclave of emerging and global south economies in October, President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to reboot India-China ties, which had veered dangerously off-course in June 2020, when the troops of both countries brawled in Eastern Ladakh’s Galwan valley. The unarmed clash caused casualties on both sides, triggering a new wave of anxiety,  but, fortunately and wisely, also a lengthy military and diplomatic dialogue to maintain border peace and tranquillity.

After the pivotal Xi-Modi talks, top officials of both sides began to take baby steps to nurse a fragile relationship. The November meeting between Wang and his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar, yielded a decision in principle to restart direct flights between the two countries, resume journalistic exchanges and ease visa restrictions.  

On the border, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Wang agreed on a six-point formula for finding a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable “package solution” to the boundary issue.

Now that the leaders of both countries want to scale up ties, arguably to an unprecedented level, what are the pathways that need to be explored to achieve that goal?

There are at least three talking points that may help to permanently energise the India-China relationship.

First, taking the cue from Wang’s advocacy of joint engagement with the Global South and President Xi’s call for dialogue on major world affairs, India and China need to revisit the 2+1 dialogue mechanism. Under this formulation, the 2—India and China—were to coordinate a unified stance towards 1, a Global South nation.

The 2+1 formula was tested soon after the 2018 Wuhan informal summit between President Xi and Prime Minister Modi. During a conversation with KP Sharma Oli, the visiting Prime Minister of Nepal, President Xi had reportedly explained the mechanism to the visitor from Nepal. It is understood that in China’s perception, New Delhi and Beijing could apply the  2+1 formula in  other geographies of the Global South as well. After Wang’s statement, the 2+1 could be revisited and expanded. In fact, with the rise of multipolarity, the 2+1 mechanism could mutate into  a 3+1 template, with Russia as the third country joining the fray. Indeed, the Russia-India-China (RIC) dialogue to shape a trilateral consensus towards engaging specific nations of the Global South may become the most efficient vehicle to foster peace and prosperity in large parts of a transitioning world.

Second, India and China, instead of pursing rivalry now need to integrate their giant trans-national connectivity projects. India may need to revisit its blanket rejection of all projects under the China-led Belt and Road Intitiave(BRI) , geared towards the revival of the ancient Silk Route. India’s rejection of the BRI followed China’s decision to construct the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Starting from the Gwadar, the coastal city on the Arabian Sea, it headed north towards Kashgar, an ancient caravan city in China’s Xinjiang autonomous region. But on the way, the corridor passes through Gilgit Baltistan—a part of undivided Kashmir over which India exercises territorial claims. Besides, India has raised objections of BRI projects citing lack of financial transparency, ecological deficiencies  and limited social impact at the grassroots. 

Despite the merits of its argument, a pragmatic India may need to de-link its legitimate claims regarding the illegality of the CPEC from some of the other BRI projects from which New Delhi can benefit.

For starters, the Asian trilateral highway that links India, Myanmar and Thailand can easily hook up with the Thailand-China high speed network opening a vast hinterland for trade, commerce and  people-to-people ties. In other words, with Thailand on the trilateral highway as the junction, it would be possible to access the golden rail corridor of southeast Asia, starting from Thailand to Kunming in China via Laos.  

 Indian scholar Zorawar Daulet Singh points out in his book Power Shift: India-China Relations in a Multipolar World that at the second BRI Forum held in 2019 in Beijing, the Chinese leaders might have responded to the critique from India and other countries. He points out that the communique released at the forum called for ‘extensive consultation,’ ‘green’ , ‘people-centred and sustainable development’ as well as ‘high-quality, sustainable infrastructure’ that is ‘inclusive and broadly beneficial.’

Third, despite post-Covid attempts at forging alternative supply chains to de-risk overreliance on Beijing, it is evident that China remains the fount of global supply chains. Consequently, there is no geo-economic alternative to China if India has to fulfil its dream of Viksit Bharat or developed India by its  self-declared timeline of 2047, marking 100 years of its independence.

“For India, the primary economic centre to be leveraged now is China,” opines Singh, in a recent article in the Times of India.

He adds: “There is no way around this reality. It is not whether but how to economically engage China. What should be debated are the inter-sectoral trade-offs, the types of economic partnerships between Indian and Chinese economic actors, the extent of access to Chinese capital and technologies, and India’s participation in China-centred supply chains. These are sophisticated policy themes that require serious deliberation but were previously swept aside during the unipolar euphoria.”

Third, as goodwill grows and common aspirations soar, China needs to show visible change on the ground in its stance on India. For instance, Beijing remains the only holdout among the P5 countries that has not endorsed India’s presence in an expanded UN Security Council. That needs to  change to impart confidence, after several false starts, in New Delhi that China indeed sees India as a partner and not a competitor in shaping a multipolar world order based on new rules written by the BRICS+ countries, the Global South and the western pole in a multipolar setting.

Once confidence is restored and becomes irreversible, the post-Kazan revival of India-China ties can cast a deep imprint and go a long way in realising the full potential of Sino-Indian ties in shaping a new post-west world order.