How the G20 countries meeting will affect the development of global conflicts


All major conflicts of our time are associated with the participation or non-participation of some of the twenty leading states of the world. And in the vast majority of these clashes — as well as the complex interweaving of conflicting interests — the United States is implicated.

Therefore, the meeting of the G20 countries, which opened in the Japanese city of Osaka, by the very fact of its holding, forced the leaders of the leading economic - and, consequently, political - world powers to take a pause. And jointly analyze the situation on, so to speak, operational map.

On this map there are a lot of sharp points marked with arrows and circles. The Middle East, above all, Iran - the United States, Israel and Syria. Venezuela and the general tense opposition of regimes in Latin America. Mexico. Almost all of Africa, especially the countries of the Sahel. Libya. South Korea - DPRK. Japan - Russia. Russia and NATO. Ukraine - Donbass. Georgia. Kosovo. Afghanistan. Pakistan - India, USA - China.

But in general, having gone to the second round, one can single out the main points of tension. The most threatening. There are three of them: USA - Iran, USA - China, West - Russia.

With all the diversity of these three major conflicts and all of them, so to speak, “diversity of threatenedness”, they have one thing in common. This condition in boxing is called a “clinch” - when opponents came together so tightly in the fight that they actually blocked each other. And they should either shrink back, or resort to victory to actions beyond morality.

Beyond morality in modern international politics, armed actions are considered. No matter how idealistic it may sound, but in the current world situation, war is really a taboo.

Twenty years ago they grabbed the war like the last argument of kings. Since then, some countries have been conducting anti-terrorist operations - or what this term means. But direct interstate hostilities are not being resolved. And an excellent illustration of this relatively new political phenomenon is the refusal of US President Donald Trump to launch a military strike on Iran.

However, the same case can serve as a classic example of a clinch in interstate relations. Israel really wants to deal with Iran. Nothing personal, as they say, simply in Tel Aviv they consider this a matter of national security. But since Israel has little strength for the war against Iran, through its powerful lobby in Washington everything is putting up a hefty and well-controlled fellow in the image of the United States. And in the end it really came to the clinch. Because Iran does not want to be intimidated by American aircraft carriers, and the US president does not want to decide on a real war with 80 million people with a strong and motivated army.]

It’s too early to talk about a “truce” between Russia and the West. But still a step in this direction has been made. Albeit symbolic, but important: just on the eve of the G-20 meeting, the PACE decided to invite Russia to return to work in the Parliamentary Assembly of the European countries in a full format. Whether the formal consent of Washington was to him or Europe decided to act on its own, with the eyes deliberately covered by the Americans, is still unknown. Of course, it is still far from the final peace and, moreover, the restoration of the previous cooperation, but somehow this is also a vector for a truce, which is tacitly supported by the United States.