Greater Eurasia. Opportunity or Downsizing for Russia?


In recent years the idea of Greater Eurasia seems to constitute the main strategic reference of Russian foreign policy. However, as many analysts observe, the outlines of this idea are still largely uncertain, if not contradictory. In particular, it is difficult to clearly distinguish its relationship with other recent Russian intellectual and political ventures such as Eurasianism, Eurasian Economic Union (EUAE) and Turn to East[1]. The emphasis with which Greater Eurasia is used by the Russian leadership and its diffusion in political research testify to its relevance. Furthermore, the role of Eurasianism in the Greater Eurasia grabbed international attention and even rang some alarm bells: indeed, Eurasianism could be interpreted as a cultural and geopolitical justification for Russian imperialism replacing the role Marxism-Leninism in Soviet times. Considering all of the above, this topic of Greater Eurasia should be addressed very carefully in order to try to define Russia’s self-perception as well as its ability to produce an effective foreign policy.

From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia

A long time has passed since 2001, when the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi proposed common economic space between the EU and Russia. A proposal that seemed entirely utopian in the absence of a free-trade agreement, but which showed that the Brussels leadership was willing to take this perspective into consideration. On the other hand, Russia too appeared amenable to the project of a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Putin himself referred to this idea in his speech at the 2005 EU-Russia summit[2].

As a matter of fact, even in those honeymoon years of the Russian-EU relations Moscow was not fully willing to accept EU norms and standards. The political deterioration between the EU and Russia in the years that followed made such a development less realistic[3]. Moscow then began to develop a Eurasian integration project that provoked both contempt and alarm in the West[4]. While there are fears that Russia may use Eurasianism to replace Marxism-Leninism as a new imperial ideology in the post-Soviet space, its ability to achieve this goal was completely denied. In any case, the results of this Russian project have so far been modest: in July 2011 a Customs Union was born, including only Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; it became the Common Economic Area in 2012 and the EAEU in 2015. While covering three quarters of the post-Soviet space, this project was strongly hindered by the failure to include Ukraine, which after the 2014 crisis turned decisively towards the West. Indeed, the rivalry between Russia’ Eurasian project and the European Eastern Partnership project should be seen as the main cause of the Ukrainian crisis and of the conflict between Russia and the West[5].

In addition, the growing reluctance of Belarus and Kazakhstan to engage politically as well as economically within the EAUE weakens the integration process enhanced by the Kremlin. The entry into the EAEU of economically and politically weak states such as Armenia (October 2014) and Kyrgyzstan (May 2015) has hardly changed this rather disappointing situation[6].

Russia’s persistent economic weakness and the diffidence of many post-Soviet countries to fully adhere to a project largely dominated by Moscow make it difficult for the EAEU to meet its initial ambitions. Besides, the Eurasian integration project also has to deal with the much more dynamic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 by Beijing.

Indeed, Moscow put up a good facade before the Chinese project, probably because it had no choice. The conflict with the West that followed the Ukrainian crisis and the unstoppable growth of China actually forced Russia to strengthen strategic cooperation with its great Asian neighbour[7].

The idea of Greater Eurasia was born in this context of challenges coming from both East and West. In an article published in February 2015 Dmitry Trenin, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, remarked that in place of “Greater Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which was proclaimed by Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev, a “Greater Asia” is beginning to take shape[8]. In April of that year, some analysts from the Valdai Club, including Sergey Karaganov and Timofey Bordachev, published a report in which they claimed it was time to integrate the Russian EAEU project with that of the Chinese BRI:

However, in 2015 we can speak on the birth of the “Central Eurasian Moment”, which is the unique confluence of international political and economic circumstances that allows for the renewed potential for cooperation and common development within the states of this region. The main driving forces behind the transformation of Central Eurasia into a zone of joint development will be Eurasian economic integration, led by Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as by Belarus and the Silk Road Economic Belt project[9].

In another article of the same period, Karaganov highlights that “[...] large blocks are being created in the world and Greater Eurasia (Bolshaia Evraziia) will be one of those”[10]. Alexandr Lukin, an important specialist in Russian-Chinese relations, also contributed significantly to the formation of this idea by supporting the evidence of the formation of “[...] the system of Greater Eurasia, the states of which will not be tied by alliance relations, as are the United States and its European satellites”[11]. At the end of 2015, the idea of Greater Eurasia had clearly emerged in its general outline. This vision obviously does not constitute an absolute novelty, since the idea of a particular closeness of Russia to Asia is already central not only in the Eurasianist thought of the 1920-30s[12], but also in the “mystical” neo-Eurasism of Lev Gumilev (1912-1992)[13] and in that of the controversial political thinker Aleksandr Dugin, largely influenced by the geopolitical ideas of Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt, as well as by the positions of the new contemporary European Far Right.

The neo-Eurasist perspective, especially the radically anti- Western version elaborated by Dugin, has often been linked to Putin since his rise to power. However, this is a quite inadequate interpretation:

Dugin’s networks are those of the European New Right, rooted in barely concealed fascist traditions, and with some assumed intellectual and individual affiliations with the Nazi ideology and post-Nazi elusive transformations. On the contrary, the Kremlin has progressively created a consensual ideology without doctrine, founded on Russian patriotism and classical conservative values: social order, authoritarian political regime, the traditional family etc... [14]

Many Western analysts probably overestimate the importance of this author, on the one hand attributing to him a nonexistent political and cultural centrality in contemporary Russia, on the other hand projecting his ideological extremism onto every Eurasian project proposed by Russia. In fact, the role of a fundamental figure such as Yevgeny Primakov (1929- 2015), Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Russia in the late 1990s[15], was much more important for the formation of the Greater Eurasia project: “Russia’s Kissinger and architect of the Primakov Doctrine espoused a Sino-Russian alliance [...] against Western unilateralism”[16].

Economic, Security and Ideological Dynamics of Greater Eurasia

In the international political scenario, which emerged after the Ukrainian crisis, the expression Greater Eurasia began to be used more and more frequently by various members of the Russian elite until Putin himself adopted it in June 2016 on the occasion of the International Economic Forum of Saint Petersburg:

We are aware of the impressive prospects of cooperation n between the EAEU and other countries and integration associations. [...] Our partners and we think that the EAEU can become one of the centres of a greater emergent integration area. Among other benefits, we can address ambitious technological problems within its framework, promote technological progress and attract new members. We discussed this in Astana quite recently. Now we propose considering the prospects for more extensive Eurasian partnership involving the EAEU and countries with which we already have close partnership - China, India, Pakistan and Iran - and certainly our CIS partners, and other interested countries and associations. [...] Friends, the project I have just mentioned - the “Greater Eurasia” project - is, of course, open for Europe, and I am convinced that such cooperation may be mutually beneficial. Despite all of the well- known problems in our relations, the European Union remains Russia’s key trade and economic partner. It is our next-door neighbour and we are not indifferent to what is happening in the lives of our neighbours, European countries and the European economy[17].

The concept of Greater Eurasia is presented by Putin as a development of the EAEU and does not exclude cooperation with Europe, far from it. However, it is clear that the emphasis is no longer on the centrality of Russian-European relations, but on the possibility that Europe will also participate in the larger Eurasian project focused mainly on Russia and China[18].

This is obviously a change of great importance. Ever since, Greater Eurasia has been an essential part of the official Russian discourse, intended primarily as a decisive step in the realization of a new multipolar international order based on collaboration between the main powers. According to Sergey Karaganov,

The partnership or community of Greater Eurasia is, first of all, a conceptual framework that sets the direction for interaction among states on the continent. It should be committed to promoting joint economic, political, and cultural revival and development of dozens of Eurasian countries, backward or oppressed in the past, and turning Eurasia into the global economic and political center. [...] The partnership of Greater Eurasia should be based on the traditional postulates of international law and international coexistence, and rejection of all forms of universalism, supremacy of certain values over others, and one’s a priori rightness or hegemony[19].

This project is clearly opposed to the political and cultural hegemony of the West and the US in particular, but its configuration appears to be largely fluid and open to different interpretations[20]. This indeterminacy can be considered a weakness, but also a strength as it makes it applicable in different fields, not only in the economic one as is the case of the EAEU[21].

There is of course also an economic dimension of Greater Eurasia, which Moscow sees as a privileged space for trade between Europe and Asia, especially since the main transit routes go through Russia[22].

In addition, this project should also contribute to the enhancement of the Russian Far East, which remains largely underdeveloped despite its immense potential for growth. According to most analysts, Russia is unable to effectively carry out its Eurasian economic integration project. In particular, the attempt to place EAEU at the centre of Greater Eurasia strategy has so far produced very limited results[23].

The strengthening of economic cooperation with Asian countries certainly constitutes a fundamental priority for Russia, but at the same time it suffers from increasing asymmetry with China. This situation is often framed in entirely negative terms:

Instead of taking on the role of a regional integrator, Russia is rapidly turning into a subordinate element of Chinas own far- reaching plans. The only beneficiary is Beijing, which is aptly capitalizing on Moscow’s misconceptions[24].

Such a view is of course not shared by those who believe that Russia is able to successfully manoeuvre in the new Eurasian scenario. According to Karaganov, for example:

The old order is destroyed [...] We have to build a new one, which will be weakly bipolar. One pole will be around the United States, the other, Greater Eurasia, will have China as its economic leader, but this country will not be hegemonic. Beijing will be balanced by Moscow, Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, Tehran, Jakarta and Manila[25].

Moscow’s strength in this new pole evidently depends on its ability to guarantee regional security. Indeed, this is the only field in which Russia outweighs China, thanks to its considerable military modernisation in recent years and the successes achieved in Ukraine and especially in Syria:

[...] Russia’s contribution to the fight against the structures of Islamic terrorism and the liberation of part of Syria and Iraq from its control can be seen as a sort of examination for the role of sheriff of the Greater Eurasia[26].

From this point of view, the military effectiveness of Russia establishes the necessary balance between the two main countries of Greater Eurasia, based on a sort of “division of labour”, within which China dominates the economic sphere while Russia has a leading role in ensuring security through CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) facilities. Therefore, this “division of labour” seems to guarantee a substantially equal relationship and a win-win perception of Greater Eurasia[27].

The most controversial aspect of Greater Eurasia is the ideological one. Despite its declared pragmatic attitude, this project in fact represents a revival of a cultural view that first emerged in the XIX century, namely that Russia should follow a path based on the autonomous historical, geographical and social features of the country as opposed to imitating the European model: from Nikolay Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontev, who developed a vision of universal history as a plurality of autonomous civilisations (“cultural-historical types”), to the founder of Eurasianism, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, who vehemently contested Eurocentrism in his Europe and Mankind (1920)[28], until the so-called “civilisational approach”, which spread in the post-Soviet era in neo-Eurasianist circles.

This civilisational approach is also evident in many supporters of the Greater Eurasia project. Even without contesting the essentially European character of Russian culture, the conflict with the West that has developed in recent years seems to have strengthened Russia’s search for its own specificity. In Russia the centuries-long assumption of the pre-eminence of the West is now in decline, while the simultaneous growth of the Far East leads to rethinking priorities and strategies. The crisis with the West has actually pushed Russia to intensify political and economic relations with China and other Asian countries with which it also broadly shares ideological orientations. It is not only a matter of challenging the US-led unipolar order that emerged at the end of the Cold War, but also of a Weltanschauung that rejects the alleged universality of Western values and instead focuses on national ones. If in his official speeches Putin increasingly defines Russia as a conservative country founded on Christian Orthodox values[29], the revival of Confucian heritage in China and of neo-Hinduism in India is also a form of reaffirming the primacy of national traditions. As Fedor Lukyanov has observed:

The need to preserve sovereignty - not only in a political sense, but also from the point of view on national identity - is again perceived as a norm. The liberal-cosmopolitan utopia of the late twentieth century is rejected in the shadows[30].

Therefore, according to this author, Russia should pursue a selfperception based on the idea of “civilisation” that corresponds more effectively to Russia’s historic traditions and to its relations with neighbouring states[31]. Such a civilisational approach is also expressed in an important speech given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov in Munich on 18 February 2017:

Humanity stands at a crossroads today. The historic era that could be called the post-Cold War order has come to an end.

This global model was pre-programmed for crisis right from the time when this vision of economic and political globalisation was conceived primarily as an instrument for ensuring the growth of an elite club of countries and its domination over everyone else. It is clear that such a system could not last forever. Leaders with a sense of responsibility must now make their choice. I hope that this choice will be made in favour of building a democratic and fair world order, a post-West world order, if you will, in which each country develops its own sovereignty within the framework of international law, and will strive to balance their own national interests with those of their partners, with respect for each country’s cultural, historical and civilisational identity[32].

Lavrov himself often refers to the Greater Eurasian Partnership. For example, in a speech held in New Delhi on 5 January, he said that

“The Russian initiative of forming Greater Eurasian Partnership has become established as a concept of long-term political and diplomatic efforts [...]”[33].

Assessments of the Russian project of Greater Eurasia vary greatly. Western analysts’ comments are usually hostile or dismissive. So, for example, Bobo Lo says that “Much of the ideology surrounding the Greater Eurasia concept is presentational rather than inspirational. It supplies a veneer of cultural-civilizational unity to what is really a jumble of ideas, few of which have been properly thought through”[34].

This kind of criticism seems to be almost unconsciously affected by a prejudicial depreciation of any Russian cultural or political initiative that calls into question the superiority of the Western model and the universal dimension of its values. This is especially true if such initiatives are based on the Eurasian idea, which seems to be particularly irritating for almost everyone who studies it from a Western viewpoint.

Anyway, it should be borne in mind that the conceptual elaboration of Greater Eurasia does not come from outsiders such as Gumilev or Dugin, but from figures widely included in the official discourse of contemporary Russia. Indeed, its constant use by Putin and Lavrov also certifies that this is a vision now shared by Russian political leaders.

More generally, it cannot be overlooked that this discourse intercepts an indisputable reality of today s international scenario, namely the emergence from China to Turkey of an immense political space in which Western liberal norms are widely challenged. In an international system that increasingly takes on the characteristics of a post-liberal and post-western world[35], the Russian idea of Greater Eurasia is far from groundless. For this reason, as some have put it, “[...] the temptation to dismiss the Valdai school as merely the latest geopolitical imaginary in Russian foreign policy is short-sighted”[36].

The main point is rather to understand the effectiveness of this vision as a tool of Russia’s foreign policy. It can be observed that while Russia plays a dominant role within the EAEU, in Greater Eurasia its role is evidently downsized, primarily because of Chinese superiority. Even a supporter of this project like Dmitry Efremenko wrote “that Russia cannot avoid recognizing the general primacy of China, but maintains equal rights and freedom of manoeuvre”[37]. These are certainly not obvious words from the perspective of a Russia accustomed to thinking of itself as a great power, but which is hampered in its ambitions by numerous internal difficulties, first and foremost its structural economic weakness compared to the United States and China[38]. But also by the persistence of a Western orientation among the elite and the inertia of the bureaucracy[39].

In any event, Russia’s tilt towards Asia is probably destined to continue. As Lukin wrote Greater Eurasia should be considered “[...] not as goal of Russian and Chinese diplomacy, but as an objective reality reflecting fundamental processes in world politics”[40]. Indeed, Russia’s distance from the EU and the United States has not diminished in recent years. Moscow’s relations with some European countries remain fraught, while Trump’s presidency has not led to the Russia-US rapprochement that some have been waiting for. As noted by the Director of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, the Greater Eurasia project does not have to face these difficulties because most Asian countries do not perceive Russia as a threat. Furthermore, unlike the rigid institutional framework of the EU, the various “Eurasian” initiatives are deliberately vague precisely so as not to discourage potential partners:

Therefore, it easier for Russia to plug itself into emerging Asian mechanisms and regimes - not as a latecomer, but as one of the founding fathers and in some cases as of the leaders. This is not to say that the European project is of no significance to Russia.

Quite the opposite is true. The most important comparative advantage of Moscow in Asia is exactly Russia’s “European” nature. Only by articulating this nature can Russia become a valuable building block in the new Greater Eurasia. [...] Therefore, for Moscow it is crucially important to maintain and to expand its historic human, cultural, educational and other ties to Russia’s European cradle[41].

Therefore, the turn to Asia can be considered appropriate for Russia from a “European” perspective as well. Looking back in history, a similar shift occurred in the second half of the XIX century when Russia intensified the Eastern vector of its foreign policy after the disappointments of the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress. It was then that Dostoevsky wrote the famous words “In Europe we are hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia we walk as masters”[42] which are often repeated with regard to Russia’s recent pivot to Asia[43].


Can the Greater Europe project be considered an effective way to restore Russia’s great power status? It is doubtful, indeed. Unlike Marxism-Leninism, which had a potentially global attractiveness, it lacks an adequate ideological basis. In fact, despite the hopes of some and the fears of others, Eurasianism is not really attractive to post-Soviet countries, not even to those of Central Asia and certainly not beyond them. This project therefore does not have real hegemonic potential; it should rather be interpreted as a response to the difficult challenges imposed on Russia by todays political and economic evolution. At the same time, the Greater Eurasia project is ambitious and difficult to implement. It reasserts the persistent Russian claims of a historical-cultural specificity in an international scenario which sees Russia clashing with an apparently declining West and the impetuous rise of the Far East, led by China. This project is based on the belief that these three political dynamics will continue to develop, and that in this situation the Eurasian choice is both advantageous and obligatory for Moscow.

However, this is a risky choice, because the growing economic and demographic gap puts Russia in a clearly subordinate position with respect to China. Even without sharing the prejudicial hostility of many Western observers towards Eurasian integration projects, one wonders if this perspective is really the most convenient for Russia. But equally legitimate is the question of whether it is really convenient for the West to persist in its uncompromising and prescriptive attitude, which has greatly contributed to Russia’s Eastern choice.



[1]  B. Lo, Greater Eurasia. The Emperor’s New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Cornei, Institut Francis des Relations Internationales (IFRI), July 2019, p. 11.

[2] A.V. Tsvyk, “'Greater Europe’ or 'Greater Eurasia’? In search of new ideas for the Eurasian integration”, RUDN Journal of Sociology, 2018, voi. 18, no. 2, pp. 262-70.

[3] A. Kortunov, ''One More Time on Greater Europe and Greater Eurasia”, Russia in Global Affairs, 5 October 2018.

[4] S.E Starr and S.E. Cornell, Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Washington D.C.; N. Popescu, Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the likely, Chaillot Paper, no. 132, 9 September 2014.

[5]  E. Korosteleva, Z. Paikin, and S. Paduano (eds.), Dive years after Maidan: Toward a Greater Eurasia?,Compass, Uptake, Lse lldeas. May 2019, p. 7.

[6]  C. Vasilyeva and M. Lagutina, The Russian Project of Eurasian Integration. Geopolitical Prospects, Lanham - Boulder - New York — London, Lexington Books, 2016; A. Ferrari, Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. A Tailed Project?, in A. Ferrari (ed.), Putin’s Russia: Really Back?, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2016, pp. 115-130.

[7] G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to Wo rld o rder. National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s, Woodrow Wilson Center, Stanford University Press, 2014; M. Lubina, Russia and China. Л political marriage of convenience. Opladen - Berlin - Toronto, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2017; A. Ferrari and E. Tafuro Ambrosetti (eds.), Prussia and China. Anatomy of a Partnership, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2019.

[8] D. Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia, Carnegie Moscow Center, 26 February 2015.

[9] Toward the Great Ocean 3 — Creating Central Eurasia, Valdai Club, 2015, p. 8. On the “invention” of Greater Eurasia see D.G. Lewis, “Geopolitical Imaginaries in Russian Foreign Policy: The Evolution of 'Greater Eurasia”’, EuropeAsia Studies, voi. 70, no. 10, December 2018, pp. 1615-18.

[10]  S. Karaganov, “Pervye kontury Bolshij Evrazii” (“First outlines of Greater Eurasia”), Rossja vglobaPnoj politike,29 May 2015.

[11]  A. Lukin, Russia, China and the Emerging Greater Eurasia, The Asan Forum, 18 August 2015.

[12] M. Lamelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008; D. Shlapentokh (ed.), Russia Between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, Leiden - Boston, Brill, 2007; M. Bassin, S. Glebov, and M. Lamelle (eds.). Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Eegacies of Russian Eurasianism,Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015.

[13]    M. Bassin, The Gumilev mystique: biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the construction of community in modern Russia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2016.

[14]    M. Lamelle, Dangerous Eiasons: Eurasianism, the European Ear Right, and Putin’s Russia, in M. Lamelle (ed.), Eurasianism and the European Ear Right: Reshaping the Euro — Russian Relationship, London, Lexington Books, 2015, p. 23.

[15]  See The unknown Primakov. Memoirs, Moscow, Publishing House TPP RF, 2016; and the article by D. Novikov, “llycar5 rossijskogo realizma” (“O he Knight of Russian Realism”), in F. Lukyanov (ed.), Conservatism vo vnesnejpolitike: XXI vek ('Conservatism in foreign policy: XXI century), special issue of “Rossia v globalnoi politike”, 2017, pp. 119-132.

[16]   M.L. Levin, The Next Great Clash. China and Prussia vs. The United States, Westport- London, Praeger, 2008, p. 130.

[17]    V. Putin, Speech at plenary session of the XX St Petersburg International Economic Forum, Saint Petersburg, 17 June 2016.

[18] D.G. Lewis (2018), p. 1617.

[19] S. Karaganov, “The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, voi. 9, 2018, p. 90. See also R. Sakwa, Prussia against the Rest. The post-cold war crisis of world order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 292-293.

[20]  A. Kuznetsova, Greater Eurasia. Perceptions from Russia, the European Union, and China, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 1 September 2017.

[21]  B. Lo, Greater Eurasia. The Emperor’s New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Cornei, Institut I Cancais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), July 2019.

[22]  On this topic see G. Diesen, Russia ’s Geoeconomic Strategy for a Greater Eurasia, New York, Routledge, 2019.

[23]  R. Dragnewa-Lewers, What Role for the Eurasian Economic Union in Greater Eurasia?, in E. Korosteleva, Z. Paikin, and S. Paduano (eds.). Fire years after Maidan: Toward a Greater Eurasia?, Compass, Uptake, Lse lldeas. May 2019, p. 7.

[24]  S. Sukhankin, “From 'Turn to the East’ to 'Greater Eurasia’: Russia’s Abortive Search for a Far East Strategy”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, voi. 15, no. 177, 14 December 2018.

[25] S. Karaganov, “God pobed. Chto dal’she?” (“A year of victories. What else?”), Rossiia v glob almi politike, 16 January 2017.

[26]  D. Efremenko, “Rozhdenie Bolshoi Evrazii” (“The Birth of Greater Eurasia”), in F. Lukyanov (ed.), Konserratipm vo vneshneipolitike: XXI vek (Conservatism in foreign policy: XXI century), special issue of Russia v glob almi politike, 2017, p. 169.

[27] B. Lo (2019).

[28]  See the English translation in N. Trubetzkoy, The Fegacy of Genghis Khan and other essays on Russia’s Identity, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publications, 1996.

[29]  A. Ferrari, Russia. At Conservative Society?, in A. Ferrari, (ed.), Russia 2018. Predictable Flections, Uncertain Future, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2018, pp. 33-53.

[30] F. Lukyanov (2017), p. 9.

[31] Ibid., p. 11.

[33]  D.R. Chaudhury, “Russia pushes India’s entry into Eurasian Economic Union strengthening third country coop”. The Economic Times, 5 January 2020.

[34]  B. Lo (2019).

[35]  A. Colombo and P. Magri (eds.). The End of a World. The decline of the liberal order, ISPI Annual Report, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2019.

[36] D.G. Lewis (2018), p. 1633.

[37] D. Efremenko, “Rozhdenie Boshoi Evrazii” (“The birth of Greater Eurasia”), in Konserratipm vo vnesnejpolitike: XXI vek (Conservatism in foreign policy: XXI century), special issue of Rossiia v glob almi politike, 2017, p. 168.

[38]  A. Ferrari, “Russia between the United States and China: A Possible Third Power?”, in A. Colombo and P. Magri (eds.). Work in Progress. The End of a World, partii, Annual Report 2020, Milan, Ledizioni-ISPI, 2020, pp. 152-161.

[39] See T. Bordachev, “Novoye yevraziistvo: Как sdelaf sopryazhenie rabotayushchim” (“New Eurasianism. How uniting workers”), Rossiia v globalnoipolitike, 14 October 2015.

[40] A. Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Central Asia and the Idea of Greater Eurasia”, IndiaQuaterly, voi. 75, no. 1, 2019.

[41]  A. Kortunov (2018).

[42]  F.M. Dostoevsky, The Diary of a Writer, voi. 2 (1877-1881), Evanston (111.), Northwestern University Press, 1997, p. 1373.

[43]  R. Sakwa, Prussian Politics and Society, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 378; A.M. Chenoy and R. Kumar, Re-emerging Russia. Structures, Institutions and Processes, Singapore, Paigrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 229.