The Failed Bolivian Coup Attempt

Bolivian General Juan José Zúñiga led an ultimately failed coup attempt in Bolivia on 26 June one day after he was dismissed for threatening at the beginning of the week to arrest former President Evo Morales if the latter tried to run for president again during next year’s elections. His primary demand was to change the Cabinet of Ministers and release those who he deemed “political prisoners” such as Jeanine Áñez, who assumed power after 2019’s military coup but has since been jailed.

President Luis Arce confronted him at the Presidential Palace and told him to return to his barracks. The coup then fell apart because it was clear that Zúñiga didn’t have full military backing. He was later arrested, but not before scandalously claiming that Arce told him to stage some political drama in order to boost his popularity amidst a worsening intra-socialist rivalry with Morales and a spiraling economic-financial crisis. Morales and Argentine President Javier Milei have since accused Arce of faking the coup.

Some people believe that the CIA was behind it though, which isn’t implausible considering its history of meddling in this South American nation. Bolivia also has the world’s largest lithium reserves, which are integral to the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” due to their use in electric batteries. Moreover, Arce had just returned from the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum where he gave a speech about multipolarity, met with President Putin, and committed to comprehensively enhancing bilateral ties.

It thus appears to some that this could have been yet another US-backed regime change plot, which the authorities haven’t ruled out since the investigation continues. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement on the matter also “warn[ed] against attempts at destructive foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Bolivia and other countries”. This interpretation of events suggests that the US wanted to seize control of Bolivia’s lithium, punish Arce for his multipolar foreign policy, and ruin Bolivian-Russian relations.

Another interpretation is that Zúñiga acted opportunistically after he was dismissed from his post under the false expectation that the military would support his anti-socialist putsch. He might also have had some contact with the US Government, which could have promised him support if he succeeded, but might not have had anything to do with the run-up to events. The reason for skepticism about its role is that none of the traditional preconditioning of the population was present.

Additionally, the military proved that it wasn’t united behind him, which is yet another point of evidence in support of the abovementioned interpretation that he acted opportunistically without any serious prior preparations or CIA support. In this version of events, Zúñiga might have expected that the intra-socialist rift between Arce and Morales had already created an opening for him to exploit and that the government would thus tumble the moment that he moved the military into the Presidential Palace.

The third interpretation is that Arce staged the coup in collusion with Zúñiga in order to boost his popularity, especially vis-à-vis Morales, and distract from the country’s spiraling economic-financial crisis. According to this train of thought, his expulsion from the ruling Movement to Socialism (MAS) party last year greatly harmed his planned re-election prospects, and Morales remains very popular among the socialists’ base despite the Constitutional Court ruling late last year that he can’t run again.

Arce might therefore have feared that Morales could somehow or another still obtain the legal right to enter next year’s presidential race, perhaps through some loophole, hence the need to present himself as the defender of Bolivian democracy by dramatically thwarting a staged coup attempt. He could have calculated that this would make him more popular than Morales and could then be used to blame the country’s economic-financial crisis on the CIA in the aftermath in order to eschew responsibility for it.

Whatever version of events one subscribes to, there are several indisputable takeaways from what just happened. First, Zúñiga’s scandalous claim successfully widened the intra-socialist rift after Morales threw his support behind it, which further divides that movement ahead of next year’s presidential election. Second, this outcome benefits the right-wing opposition, even though they still remain weak. And third, the military was just humiliated by what just happened, and some might want revenge.

It’s therefore possible to make a general forecast about the country’s direction from these aforesaid observations. The intra-socialist rift could impede the government’s efforts to resolve the economic-financial crisis, and it might even worsen if Morales leads large-scale protests that could block crucial roadways or significantly disrupt society in some other way. A complementary scenario, which isn’t exclusive to the preceding one, is similar such protests in support of his envisaged presidential candidacy.

Morales has a long history of leading mass protests so it’s not unforeseeable that he could try to lead another one before the upcoming election, whether motivated by economic-financial and/or political reasons, in which case a clash between them and the armed forces can’t be ruled out. Arce might rely on the military to restore order, as he’d frame it at least, even if some might suspect that he’s using them to crack down on his rival. The military might either then comply or stage a bonafide coup to seize power.

Nobody should have any doubts about the US’ interest in restoring its lost influence in lithium-rich Bolivia, especially since newly pro-US Argentina also has a lot of these mineral reserves too. Milei hates socialists so that’s why he endorsed Zúñiga’s scandalous claim, not due to some secret alliance with Morales, who condemned his meddling in Bolivia’s domestic affairs. If Bolivia reverts to US influence, then its reserves could pair with Argentina’s to create an informal US-influenced monopoly.

That could then give the US an edge in the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” by enabling it to exert influence over the global supply of lithium by withholding this resource from its geopolitical opponents. To be sure, the US wouldn’t fully control this trade since neighboring Chile is one of the world’s largest producers behind Australia, plus there are other prospective reserves elsewhere to tap into. Nevertheless, it could still represent a major power play in the New Cold War.

The run-up to Bolivia’s presidential election is therefore expected to be very tense as the economic-financial crisis worsens, the intra-leftist split widens, and the traditionally US-aligned military remains mistrustful of Arce after some of them feel humiliated by the failed coup and Zúñiga’s scandalous claim. These conditions work to the right-wing opposition’s benefit and create a fertile environment in which the CIA might seriously invest the resources required into staging another 2019-like military coup.