Doha-III — middle ground for all stakeholders?

Diplomatic efforts are in full swing for the third Doha moot on Afghanistan. In a rather surprising move, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the interior minister, met with several leaders including Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi. Haqqani is wanted by the US on an up-to $10 million bounty over his involvement in an attack that killed an American citizen and other assaults. His network is also blamed for some of the bloodiest attacks against Afghanistan’s former Western-backed government. Even more surprising is the UN sanctions committee’s permission for travel to Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj not only to Haqqani as well as deputy PM Mawlawi Kabir, intelligence chief Abdul Haq Wasiq and Hajj minister Noor Saqib.

Haqqani’s emergence in Dubai, where he reportedly also met key American and other western officials, was preceded by critical talks between Qatari ministers, UN and EU officials and key Taliban ministers in Kabul last week of May to woo them into participation in the Doha-III meeting scheduled for June 30. The latest was a June 2 meeting between EU Special Representative for Afghanistan Tomas Niklasson and IEA Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi.

During the meeting, EU Special Envoy Niklasson underlined the importance of the IEA’s presence at the 3rd Doha meeting, saying that is where important issues will be taken into discussions.

After his meeting with UN Deputy Secretary General Mrs Rosemary Anne DiCarlo, FM Muttaqi had said that “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is doing its research on the framework of 3rd Doha meeting before announcing its position on the issue.”

Muttaqi, however, underlined that his country’s policy is based on a balanced and positive engagement with all the countries of the world, and seeks a meaningful participation in the 3rd Doha meeting which he hoped will bear positive results for Afghanistan.

This diplomatic activity raises some basic questions: is the Islamic Emirate attending the Doha-III meeting? Have the circumstances forced the Emirate to drop insistence on six conditions for participation? Not clear at the moment.

And have major stakeholders — including the UN, the US and the EU — come on the same page as far as the engagement with the Taliban is concerned?

The original conditions peddled by the Taliban included: a) Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations be restored to the Islamic Emirate; b) The UN must drop the appointment of a special representative for Afghanistan; 3) Agenda and composition of the third Doha meeting be discussed with the Taliban; and d) Girls’ education, women’s employment and formation of an inclusive government should not be on the agenda of the third Doha meeting.

The Emirate leadership strongly opposes the participation of Afghan civil society and political representatives in the third Doha meeting. The Taliban repeatedly stated that these are internal matters of Afghanistan and that the group is working to create a suitable environment for resolving them.

Interestingly, days before Muttaqi’s meetings with the EU and UN officials, Zakir Jalali, a senior Taliban foreign ministry official, had told a meeting of officials that “representatives of the Islamic emirate will take part in the main discussions” in Doha. Details of Jalali’s remarks were posted on X, formerly Twitter, on May 29.

“… the agenda for the third Doha format meeting has changed positively, and there are no significant differences regarding the topics of the discussion,” Jalali said, adding that the upcoming meeting would discuss financial and banking-related problems facing Afghanistan, alternative livelihoods for poppy growers and climate change impacts on the country.

Accompanying this diplomatic jokeying is a visible unrest among the western stakeholders over Russia’s decision to consider taking Taliban off the terror list — a move likely to bring Kabul-Moscow ever closer.

Besides the geopolitical considerations for influence, EU as a bloc seems to be keen to push for engaging the Taliban, albeit without recognising them.

A greater urge is discernible to help the poor in Afghanistan — based on stories of economic adversity that majority population faces. Some EU members are wondering if they can help at all. This positioning, it appears, also grows from a realisation that the Taliban are here to stay — at least for medium term.

Some diplomats wonder whether the Emirate will be able to govern effectively (meaning taking care of its citizens) if they want to rule for a long time. This question stems from humanitarian concerns as well as what seems to be a reconciliation with the way the Taliban want to lead the country.

Would this imply that the EU is ready to — at least for the time being — forego insistence on the restoration of women employment and education rights? Much bigger issue right now is the survival of millions of Afghans — men and women — in financial distress.

Despite increased revenues and improvement in some sectors of the economy, the Emirate still faces the challenge of taking the country of mere “survival mode”. Economic development and international trade comes largely through lifting or easing of sanctions on the regime.

A new realism perhaps is dawning on both the Afghan Taliban and the Western allies. The Emirate leadership realises that international engagement is unavoidable and Kabul will have to take some of global communities’ aspirations (women’s rights) into consideration which may lead to easement of international trade and financial transactions. As far the West, they probably realise that the Emirate is here to stay. The absence of an organised opposition and literally no appetite for armed conflict — neither among the people nor external players — is a big factor playing in favour of the Taliban right now.

Are we therefore seeing the emergence of an unwanted “cohabitation” as far as the US-led western nations’ engagement with the Emirate is concerned? Will Doha-III mark a semblance of a middle ground for the stakeholders, albeit without losing face — a big bargain born out of real-politik?

Source