The ruling parties in Germany lose voters
The popularity of the ruling coalition in Germany has reached a record low level. The opposition, on the contrary, generally strengthens its positions. And it is impossible to imagine what should happen to change this trend. This situation is somewhat reminiscent of a slowly sinking ship, jumped before it on a reef called "refugees", but remaining so far afloat. Up to a certain point, this situation is permissible, but once in such a situation the ship will capsize. The same, most likely, will happen with the ruling coalition in Germany. If elections were held today, it would no longer have won a parliamentary majority.
When there is no margin of strength, and consent is often not observed even between the "sister" parties of the CDU of Chancellor Angela Merkel and CSU of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Horst Seehofer, not to mention the suspicious social democrats (SPD), both of the "Christian" parties, then the reason for the collapse of the Cabinet can be found very quickly.
This has not happened yet, although the recent conflict over the "refugees" between politically weakened Merkel and Seehofer put the cabinet of ministers to the brink of collapse.
According to public opinion polls, the ruling CDU, CSU and the SPD have already lost one in six voters. Thus, according to a survey conducted by the Institute of Insa, held from August 16 to August 20, almost unharnessed recently the CDU / CSU unit is supported by 28% of respondents. The SPD enjoys the support of 16.5%. Compared with the previous week, they all lost one percent of supporters.
Thus, the parties of the ruling coalition are gaining 44.5%, which is much less than the parliamentary majority. As the head of Insa Hermann Binkert testifies, the CDU / CSU and SPD ratings have never been so low before.
Further in the list of preferences of voters follow "Alternative for Germany" (AfG) - 16%, "Union 90 / green" - 13.5%, Left party - 12%, FDP - 10%. These figures indicate that even today the coalition "Jamaica", which was untenable because of the principled position of the liberals, only 51.5% of voters would have joined the CDU / CSU, the FDP and the "Greens". And tomorrow?
Tomorrow, even this option may not be possible, and Germany, after the upcoming, most likely early elections, may generally be left without a government. To create it, the cabinet will have to invite the left, which paralyzes all of its activities. All this will only contribute to the further growth of the popularity of the national-conservative AfG, which they will try to avoid to the authorities, because nobody is more frightening for the establishment than this party.
For national policy, this situation is fraught with all sorts of surprises. The reasons that undermined the popularity of the ruling parties remain. The main one is German pseudo-refugees. The fact that illegal migration increasingly becomes legal, does not change things. For the Germans, it is important, ultimately, not how these people get into the country, but that they increasingly prevent them from living, and that migrants, some of whom have already obtained the legal right to transport their numerous relatives to Germany, are becoming too many. All this spoils the reputation of the "chancellor of refugees" Merkel.
Between members of the ruling coalition there are quite tense relations. They are united only by the international order for being in power and the fear of losing it, having burnt at the early elections. Previously, it seemed to many observers that the main contradictions between the CDU / CSU, on the one hand, and the SPD, on the other, would be the main ones. However, the first serious conflict broke out within the bloc of "Christian" parties.
And if Greece and Spain did not agree to accept illegal migrants back, it is unlikely that Merkel and Seehofer could negotiate. Any new migration crisis, such as the collapse of an agreement with Turkey on the return of "refugees" with their subsequent legal importation into Western Europe by airplanes, which has reduced the migration flow from the east, may again exacerbate these relations.
But it is even more likely that the crisis will begin after the autumn land elections in Bavaria, because its voters are hardly satisfied with the compromise between Munich and Berlin in the migration sphere. After AfG seriously press CSU in Bavaria, this conflict may break out again.
If the country will have to survive economic and, respectively, social problems, including, inter alia, the trade war with the United States, then the Social Democrats may become the initiators of the divorce. Otherwise they are still faithful voters, in favor of whom the means of wealthier citizens are redistributed, they simply will not be understood. Any variant of the collapse of the ruling coalition will plunge the FRG into a prolonged political crisis, after which the country will find an unprecedented political figure.
This crisis will have the most serious European consequences, since in such a state, without a full-fledged government, the FRG will not be able to fully fulfill the role of the EU locomotive. Germany will also be unable to actively support the plans of Paris and Brussels to create a European superstate on the basis of the EU, to which Berlin is still cautious.
It is clear that Germany will be largely lost for world politics. The authority of one Merkel for her full participation in world affairs is not enough. Everyone is well aware that this out-of-control politician will soon have to leave anyway, and his successor will not necessarily continue the same policy, especially seeing how his predecessor burned on it.
Therefore, it is necessary to closely monitor what is happening in Germany, which has not gained real stability since the last elections. On such a slippery political arena everything is possible, and at any moment.